P. Govinda Nair, J.
1. The writ applicant questions the order, Ext P1, passed by the Regional Transport Authority, Kozhikode, the first respondent to this writ application, the operative portion of which reads as follows:
"C.W.M.S. to be given extension from Eka-rool to Thalad. Timings to be modified accordingly. Temporary need exists to the extent that the construction of the Kuttiady Hydro-Electric Scheme to be done in the working season i.e., before the Monsoon."
2. "C.W.M.S." referred to stands for Messrs. Calicut Wynad Motor Service, Private, Limited, Kozhikode, and is the second respondent to this writ application. Much explanation at the Bar was necessary to understand what has been done by the first respondent. Ultimately it has turned out that the first respondent has temporarily extended the existing permit of the second respondent. The second respondent admittedly had a permit to operate a vehicle from Calicut to Ekarool. There have been many applications, it appears, made before the first respondent for the issue of temporary permits on the route Calicut -- Thalad via Ekarool. The writ applicant also had applied, So had the second respondent. His application for the permit is seen at page 87 of the file. This is in the form prescribed for the application for a temporary permit and the route mentioned in that application is the entire route from Calicut to Thalad. From the heading of the order, Ext. P1, it is not at all seen that this application has been considered and there was no application for the extension of the permit which the second respondent held for operating a vehicle between Calicut and Ekarool and Thalad. In these circumstances I am not prepared to say that counsel for the petitioner was not justified in the various attacks he made against the order, Ext. P1. Only I am not prepared to go the whole hog with him and hold that the first respondent has acted without jurisdiction.
3. Counsel for the petitioner contended that the first respondent had no authority or jurisdiction to grant any permit for which there was no application made. He invited my attention to the proviso to Section 48(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act to understand which it is necessary to read Section 48(1) as well.
"48. Grant of stage carriage permits: (1) Subject to the provisions of Section 47, a Regional Transport Authority may, on an application made to it under Section 46, grant a stage carriage permit in accordance with the application or with such modifications as it deems fit or refuse to grant such a permit:
Provided that no such permit shall be granted in respect of any route or area not specified in the application".
4. There are similar provisos in the matter of grant of contract carriage permits (proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section, 51), in the matter of grant of a private carrier's permit proviso to Sub-section (IA) to Section 53, and in the matter of grant of public carrier's permits -- proviso to Section 56(1). These perhaps imply that there is no power vested in the Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit suo motu. On this basis counsel for the petitioner proceeded to state that the requirements of all sections of the Act pertaining to the grant of the permits excepting Section 57 must be conformed to before the extension of a permit can be issued by the Regional Transport Authority under Section 57(8). He relied for this proposition on two rulings, one of this Court in Simon v. R. T. A. Alleppey, 1959 Ker LJ 859 and another of the Punjab High Court in Ambala Ex. Serviceman Transport Co-operative Society, Ltd. Ambala City v. State of Punjab, AIR 1959 Punj. 1 (FB). These decisions seem to support the contention of counsel.
5. I will, therefore, assume for the purpose of this case that there should have been an application before the Regional Transport Authority before a permit could have been granted. There was an application by the second respondent. But that was an application for the grant of a temporary permit for the; entire route from Calicut to Thalad. The only question, therefore, is whether the Regional Transport Authority is justified in modifying this application and granting a permit for a part of the route applied for. I think Section 48 enables the grant of such a permit. But counsel for the petitioner further contended that the grant of a temporary permit in continuation of an existing permanent permit was, to put it more briefly, the grant of a temporary variation for which according to him there is no provision in the statute. He tried to persuade me to reconsider my decision in O.P. No. 2180 of 1963 (Ker) wherein this question was dealt with by me. I have in my Judgment in that case given my reasons for following the view taken by this court in three cases. A different view it is contended has been expressed by Joseph J. in G.B. Transports v. R.T.A. Trichur, 1959 Ker LJ 1247: (AIR 1960 Ker 239). But this case has been distinguished by Velu Pillai J. in M.R.G. & Bros. v. Kandaswami Chettiar, 1960 Ker LJ 1202: (AIR 1961 Ker 159) and the decision in 1960 Ker LJ 1202: (AIR 1961 Ker 159): followed by Vaidialigam J. in O.P. No. 1557 of 1960 (Ker) the principles of which decision have been adopted in the Judgment in O, P. No. 234 of 1963 (Ker). It is these latter decisions that I have followed. I do not think that any new circumstance has been placed before me justifying a different conclusion.
6. I therefore feel that there is no lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Transport Authority. I cannot help remarking that the first respondent has acted in a very unsatisfactory manner and perhaps in a casual and indifferent fashion. If it felt that there was no need for the grant of any temporary permit for the route Calicut to Thalad, one would at least have expected the authority to say so particularly when the heading of the order proceeded by stating that the subject to be considered was the application for a temporary permit. The body of the proceedings indicate that the matter dealt with was different variations of an existing permit under Section 57(8). It will be desirable to refer to the matter arising for decision. If no temporary permit was to be granted, the authority could have asked the second respondent to make a specific application for the variation of the existing permit.
7. The grant is only for a temporary period. For this reason also, I do not think I should interfere with the same. I therefore dismiss this writ application. No costs.