V.S. Gaitonde, Acountant Member
1. This appeal is filed by the accountable person against the order of the Controller (Appeals) dated 25-2-1986 setting aside the order of the Assistant Controller dated 22-3-1985 and upholding the validity of the notice under Section 59 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 ('the Act'). The grounds of appeal centre primarily round the question of validity of Section 59 proceedings. The grounds also allege that there is in fact no estate escaping assessment from estate duty.
2. Shri Jairambhai Chauhan expired on 2-8-1978. On 24-7-1979 the accountable person filed a return showing the principal value of the estate at Rs. 3,32,619. This was duly scrutinised by the Assistant Controller who determined the principal value of the estate at Rs. 12,59,720. The accountable persons were aggrieved by this order of the Assistant Controller dated 1-1-1980 and filed appeal to the Appellate Controller within 2 months of the passing of the above order on 20-3-1980. The Assistant Controller commenced proceedings under Section 59 and obtained a return on 25-7-1980 showing principal value at Rs. 6,37,716. When both appeal and reassessments were pending, the Assistant Controller requested the Appellate Controller to enhance the principal value of the estate by Rs. 75,000 which according to the Assistant Controller was the value of goodwill in the firm of Byculla Trading Co. which remained to be included. In a peculiar order dated 21-7-1984 the Appellate Controller dismissed the appeal as infructuous, thus shutting out both the revenue and the taxpayer. The Appellate Controller observed as below :
Since the Assistant Controller has reopened the assessment under Section 59 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, and has to complete the estate duty assessment afresh, the appeal filed against the original order has become infructuous and therefore dismissed as such.
Possibly, the Appellate Controller did not realise the implication of his decision which in view of CIT v. A.D. Shroff  31 ITR 284 (Bom.) and S. Inder Singh Gill v. CIT  47 ITR 284 (Bom.) would disable the revenue and the accountable person from agitating the points which have been concluded in the original assessment in the course of appeal against the reassessment order, if any. Section 59 of the 1953 Act is not on par with Section 146 of Income-tax Act, 1961 ('the 1961 Act'). Anyway, since both sides have taken the Appellate Controller's order dated 21-7-1984 without murmur or protest one need say no more.
3. The accountable persons were taken by surprise when the notice under Section 59 was received by them on 22-3-1980. They desired to know the reason for reopening and the items which were alleged to have escaped assessment. They wrote a letter dated 21-4-1980 on this point but did not get any proper reply. Ultimately, they were allowed to take inspection of the records, on 26-7-1985, but in the meanwhile they filed the return under protest on 25-7-1980. They noticed that the assessment was reopened to assess the value of the share of the deceased in the goodwill of Byculla Trading Co. which had allegedly escaped assessment. They also noticed that the question had already become the subject-matter of full adjudication in the original assessment, where goodwill according to super-profits method, was worked out by the accountable person at Rs. 75,000, under protest but with a contention that there was in fact no goodwill or if it existed for deemed purpose under Section 9 of the Act, the value would be nil. The Assistant Controller accepted the latter contention with the remark in the office note that no value of the goodwill need be considered as the firm was dissolved on 28-7-1978. Shri Trivedi, in the course of hearing before us, pointed out that no goodwill was included not merely because of the dissolution of the firm prior to death (a view confirmed by the Bombay High Court on 22-6-1978 in Smt. Urmila v. CED  122 ITR 958) but also it got reduced to nil on account of dwindling profits, trouble with labour, etc. The business was actually closed without the partners getting anything in the form of surplus above the value of the assets of the firm (goodwill was not shown as asset of the firm). The dissolution deed and the labour retrenchment papers were produced before the Assistant Controller. Accordingly, it was represented before the Assistant Controller that the notice under Section 59 is bad in law. There has been no failure on the part of the accountable person to disclose truly and fully all material facts necessary for assessment. Hence, Section 59(a) would not apply. There has also been no information in consequence of which the Assistant Controller could have reason to believe that the property chargeable to estate duty has escaped assessment. Hence, Section 59(6) would not be applicable. The Assistant Controller has not discussed this aspect in his reassessment order but has instead proceeded to frame a fresh assessment as if it was the original assessment. He observed as below :
Thus the assessment, has now been reopened as stated above and it is settled law that once assessment is reopened, it is reopened assessments (sic) for all practical purposes and all the aspects of assessment are to be considered afresh as if no previous assessment was made taking into consideration this legal position about the reopening of the assessment in regard to valuation of immovables and valuation of shares, etc., de novo.
Shri Trivedi wondered how the Assistant Controller could have framed such a sweeping legal proposition. Even the case law most favourable to the taxpayer does not support such a sweeping proposition. In Smt. Saraswati Devi Lohia v. CIT  51 ITR 491 (All.) Desai CJ. did observe that if income is in fact shown to have escaped assessment, the question of validity loses all importance. At the same time his Lordship observed that the ITO should not act on mere suspicion or surmise that income might have escaped assessment or simply with a view to re-examine the matter and to find whether it has escaped assessment or not. Shri Trivedi contended that in the case before us, at the original assessment, the question of goodwill of Byculla Trading Co. was examined threadbare and the Assistant Controller, even after seeing the super profits working of goodwill, held (rightly) that there is in fact no goodwill includible in the principal value of the estate. Even in the oft-quoted V. Jaganmohan Rao v. CIT  75 ITR 373 (SC) their Lordships did not lay down any proposition as canvassed by the Assistant Controller and the ultimate ratio, as explained in CIT v. Maneklal Harilal Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd.  106 ITR 24 (Guj.) is that if an assessment is validly reopened, it stands even if the reason for which it was reopened does not survive but the actual reassessment is to be confined to those items for which the assessments could have been validly reopened even though such reasons might not have been recorded. But in no case can a mere change of opinion on the same facts justify reopening of assessment. Shri Trivedi submitted without prejudice that he would show that none of the items attempted to be roped in the reassessment could in fact have answered the condition of reopening the assessment. Apart from . the proposed addition on account of alleged goodwill, which in fact has not been actually made even in the reassessment, the revaluation of immovable properties, the revaluation of shares of the limited companies and withdrawal of exemption granted under Section 33(1)(p) of the Act in the original assessments, have not arisen, as a result of information now in the possession of the Assistant Controller but which was not before him on 1-1-1980 (date of original assessment) and which came before date of issue of notice under Section 59 (27-3-1980).
4. Shri Trivedi summed up the factual position at the time of original assessment as below :
(1) Dissolution deed dated 28-7-1978 of Byculla Trading Co., the retrenchment notice and union's reply and working of goodwill of the firm without prejudice, on the lines proposed by Assistant Controller was furnished.
(2) Detailed notes dated 10-12-1979 regarding valuation of various immovable properties were given to Assistant Controller, who scrutinised the same before finalisation.
(3) The actual gold bonds were produced before Assistant Controller to enable him to make sure that the bonds had not become the subject-matter of exemption earlier and to enable him to stamp the document so that the next holder would not again get the exemption under Section 33(1)(p). The mode of acquisition, date of acquisition and other dates to show that Section 33(1)(p) is applicable, was all before Assistant Controller.
(4) The balance sheet of limited company was shown.
Thus what has been attempted through reassessment amounts to change of opinion on the same facts, not permitted under Section 59.
5. Shri Trivedi was aware of the stand taken by the Appellate Controller that the action under Section 59 would be justified in view of the instructions of the Dy. Controller. Though not specifically referred to by the Appellate Controller the reliance is possibly on CIT v. H.H. Smt. Chand Kanwarji  84 ITR 584 (Delhi). Shri Trivedi whilst admitting that he did not have full access to the alleged note of the IAC submitted that if the gist of the same as given by the Appellate Controller is correct, the IAC has not given any 'information' but has merely directed examination and verification of certain things. The allegation of the IAC was that (paragraph 5 of the Appellate Controller's order) the Assistant Controller had not considered the provisions of Sections 2(15), 9 and 27 of the Act and that the Assistant Controller should 'verify' the facts and review the position. Such a note cannot constitute information and the facts are clearly distinguishable from those in H.H. Smt. Chand Kanwarji's case (supra). Section 59 cannot be invoked for making roving and fishing enquiries in the hope of getting some material to allege escape of estate duty. The inspection note of the IAC, the reference by the Assistant Controller to valuation cell, the Commissioner of Wealth-tax's action under Section 25 of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 in the corresponding wealth-tax assessments, etc., are all subsequent events which are not germane to the issue regarding validity of reopening the assessment. Even regarding valuation of immovable properties, nothing was kept back as seen from paragraph 1 of original assessment order which indicates that the report of expert Shri Apte and the report of Mogul Pawar were both given. If the accountable person relies on the report of Shri Apte and the Assistant Controller examines the same on merits and accepts the same, how can it be said that the accountable person has failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts on the specious plea that the assessee should have told the Assistant Controller how to discard them and adopt a higher value ? In the wealth-tax assessments the concerned assessee may have accepted a modified valuation only because of the small revenue effect. The valuation of shares was also made on the basis of expert opinion which was duly examined by the Assistant Controller at the time of original assessment. The new innovations introduced by the Assistant Controller are mere change of opinion on the same facts and such change of opinion could not have become the basis of Section 59.
6. Regarding the alleged failure to produce the original partnership deed of Byculla Trading Co. Shri Trivedi submitted that this was actually produced before the Assistant Controller. The fact that only the dissolution deed is on record cannot be a ground for making such an allegation. Even otherwise, the deed is not relevant if the Assistant Controller was satisfied that whatever be the provision in the partnership deed, there was in fact no goodwill at the relevant time. This is precisely what has happened in this case. Thus, in substance the provisions of Sections 2(15), 9 and 27 have been fully examined at the time of original assessment.
7. At this stage, we may conveniently refer to the IAC's note dated 3-3-1980. The IAC has stated that 'there appears to be under-assessment'. The IAC obtained a copy of the will of the deceased dated 17-10-1977 where the total value of the assets left by the deceased was Rs. 19,85,083. The IAC has not, however, referred to any omission of any dutiable property from the estate duty return. He referred to the value of one share of J.D. Bytco Cosmetic (P.) Ltd. as declared by the executors at Re. 1 per share. Nothing turns on this as the value adopted in the original assessment is Rs. 622 per share. The IAC has next referred to valuation, by executors, of immovable properties at Rs. 8,08,553 by execution. Here again since the original assessment takes the value at Rs. 10,47,000 as per wealth-tax records, nothing turns on this. The IAC has then worked out the principal value at Rs. 13,73,285 but it is not clear on which specific items the IAC has laid his hands. His main observations are regarding the exemption of gold bonds (Rs. 8,73,000) deduction of liabilities (Rs. 6,79,345) goodwill of Byculla Trading Co. (Rs. 75,000). The IAC has also observed that the dissolution of Byculla Trading Co. does not necessarily mean discontinuation of business and if the assets are distributed in specie, a different picture might emerge We may mention at this stage that according to Shri Trivedi from the data given to the Assistant Controller, it would be clear that the business of Byculla Trading Co. was closed, the staff was disbanded, the accounts were settled and those arose a net debit balance of Rs. 4,65,412 to the account of the deceased and this has been rightly allowed.
8. The IAC has been referred to the fact that the holding of gold bonds on the date of death has not been proved. The IAC's surmise is based on the account entries which show that Rs 5 lakhs were sent by Bank of Baroda on 2-8-1978 the date of death whereas the deceased is shown to have become the owner on 31-7-1978. The IAC has directed verification. According to Shri Trivedi there is nothing unusual and/or odd in this. It was explained to the Assistant Controller that under instruction from the deceased who was on his death bed, the Bombay broker was contacted in July 1978. The arrangement for registration of the bond was made on 31-7-1978 though the amount was received on 2-8-1978 by bank drafts which were taken personally by Shri H. J. Chauhan one of the accountable person. When the original bond itself was produced for the purpose of putting the stamp of exemption grant and when the dates of transfer are clear, according to Shri Trivedi reopening the assessment on such flimsy doubts would amount to reopening on suspicion and not 'information'.
9. The IAC has been referred to the fact that the Wealth-tax assessment have been made by the WTO, Nasik in a slipshood manner and may require revision in respect of valuation of immovable properties. It is, however, admitted that the Assistant Controller did examine the wealth-tax records and seen the assessment order dated 29-5-1979 and till the date of issue of notice under Section 59 there was no revaluation even in wealth-tax.
10. The IAC has then referred to the advisability of obtaining valuer's opinion regarding immovable properties. As this is also in the nature of new investigation and was taken up after issue of notice under Section 59 nothing turn on this issue in favour of the revenue.
11. The IAC has then doubted whether the Assistant Controller had taken a proper look at the income figures of J.D. Bytco Cosmetic (P.) Ltd. to determine the goodwill not appearing in the balance sheet. Here again there is no information that the figure work of the Assistant Controller is not correct.
12. Coming now to the order of the Appellate Controller under appeal, Shri Trivedi submitted that the Appellate Controller maybe right in observing that there is no provision in the 1953 Act corresponding to Section 148(2) of the 1961 Act requiring recording of reasons, but this does not mean that Section 59 can be invoked for effecting wholesole review of the original order and in the process introducing new subjective opinion, and innovation. The Appellate Controller may also be right in holding that the time limit for Section 59(a) and 59(6) is the same. On this ground, however, the Appellate Controller cannot say that reasons for reopening are immaterial. The allegation for sustaining Section 59(a) is on flimsy material of alleged non-production of partnership deed of Byculla Trading Co. As already pointed out above the allegation is baseless. The other allegations, viz., immovable property values, goodwill of Byculla Trading Co. revaluation of shares, denial of exemption of gold bonds are also bereft of material even for the purpose of Section 59(b) leave alone sustaining the addition in a regular assessment. The Appellate Controller therefore, clearly, erred in sustaining the action under Section 59 and setting aside the order once again making the accountable person to go through the grilling enquiries of a roving and fishing nature. The revaluation of shares proposed at Rs, 736 is also without any basis without finding any specific fault with the Assistant Controller's valuation.
13. Shri Taivedi then briefly referred to the case law which the accountable person had placed before the Appellate Controller reported in paragraph of his order. The law on the point is so clear that no reference to such elaborate case law is necessary. Nevertheless to make the story complete Shri Trivedi referred to Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. ITO  41 ITR 191 (SC) regarding the duty of the accountable person to disclose primary facts. In the estate duty return goodwill of business was shown as nil. The question of showing interest in partnership did not arise as no such partnership existed on 2-8-1978. The question of showing disposition which could be deemed to pass on death under Section 9 or 10 or 27 of the Act did not arise as there was no such thing. The assessee has to be considered as having given all facts which according to him are relevant. There can be no failure to disclose something which the assessee considered as not touching the issue unless the revenue shows that the assessee was aware of the relevance as the existence of facts. There is also no question of telling the revenue about all possible inferences that could be drawn or to tell how the revenue should scrutinise and investigate the material. Shri Trivedi then referred to CIT v. Burlop Dealers Ltd.  79 ITR 609 (SC) in support of his contention that a later inference from the same facts cannot justify reopening of concluded assessment. Referring to V. Pugalagiri v. ACED  132 ITR 847 (Mad.) which is directly on estate duty assessment Shri Trivedi contended that even where the Assistant Controller is aware of a higher value in wealth-tax assessment and adopts different value, reopening is not permitted. Reliance was placed on Ramesh Chandrasen Ashar v. K.M. Barshiwala, Addl. First ACED  148 ITR 1 (Bom.). This is, however, regarding audit objection as information. Reference was then made to G. Ameer v. CED  150 ITR 443 (Ker.) which again deals with audit opinion and information. Lastly, reference was made to ITO v. Madnani Engg. Works Ltd.  118 ITR 1 (SC) which requires disclosure of material for belief for holding that income has escaped assessment. In the case before us no such material has been brought. In support of his contention that Section 59(a) and (b) mark distinct categories without overlapping common area reliance was placed on Kanhaiyalal v. CIT  136 ITR 243 (Raj.). Shri Trivedi was prepared to argue regarding merits of the additions also but we do not propose to go into the same as the issue does not arise out of the order of the Appellate Controller.
14. In reply, Shri Roy defended the order of the Appellate Controller. The accountable person is expected to give all primary facts candidly. Whilst giving a copy of the dissolution deed, the accountable person conveniently omitted to give the vital partnership document, which had an important bearing on the question of quantification of goodwill and its deeming to pass on death. The accountable person has thus failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts. The contention of the accountable person that the implication of partnership deed were discussed at the time of original assessment has not been proved. Shri Roy then relied on the detailed note of the IAC which we have already referred to earlier. The note, according to Shri Roy, does not merely direct examination and verification but gives vital information warranting action under Section 59(6) which is supportable in view of H. H. Smt. Chand Kanwarji's case (supra). It is quite clear that goodwill did exist and did pass on death in view of CED v. Mrudula Nareshchandra  160 ITR 342 (SC). As the inference regarding goodwill has not been discussed in the order of the Assistant Controller dated 1-1-1980, it is clear that there was no application of mind. Regarding other items too, it is clear that there was no application of mind. The whole assessment was open once validly reopened as held in V. Jaganamohan Rao's case (supra). Relying on First ITO v. South India Corpn. Agency Ltd.  6 ITD 200 (Pune), Shri Roy contended that the Assistant Controller's failure to comply with the CBDT directions regarding reference of valuation as intimated by the IAC constitutes information. The reassessment may not then be confined to items mentioned by the Assistant Controller in his recorded reasons as there is no provision corresponding to Section 148(2) in the estate duty enactment. Shri Roy wound up his argument with a contention that the entire note of the IAC should be taken as a part of the reasons which weighed in the mind of the Assistant Controller.
15. In his rejoinder, Shri Trivedi was emphatic about the partnership deed having been shown to the Assistant Controller at the time of original assessment. There is also nothing to suggest that the Assistant Controller put on blinkers to all the facts which he was expected to gather from the relevant records of income-tax/ wealth-tax of the deceased and of the firms and limited companies. When the dissolution deed is shown to be produced, as this deed refers to the partnership deed, it would be reasonable to hold that the partnership deed did become the subject-matter of scrutiny. One has to take note of the fact that in the course of discussion and hearing several documents, etc., are looked into though they might not have been formally mentioned in the assessment order. The working of goodwill given at Rs. 75,000 without prejudice is itself a clear pointer. As the Assistant Controller has not denied the contention regarding production of partnership deed the statement made by the representative of the accountable person should be accepted. Shri Trivedi further clarified on the factual aspect that the business of Byculla Trading Co. came to a complete closure and did not devolve on any person after dissolution. The closing entries have been rightly taken note by the Assistant Controller. Regarding South India Corpn. Agency Ltd.'s case (supra) Shri Trivedi distinguished the same as it dealt with conversion rate to be adopted and was substantiative. In the case before us the alleged failure of the Assistant Controller in respect of valuation considered by someone else as referable to valuation cell is no failure at all. There is nothing on record to suggest that the conditions for reference to valuation cell are fulfilled, as the Assistant Controller had already examined the valuation reports of Shri Apte and Shri Mogul Pawar.
16. We have carefully examined the various facts and the arguments. Although there is no statutory requirement corresponding to Section 148(2) of the 1961 Act since the validity of the notice under Section 59 of the 1953 Act is subject to challenge in appeal, the state of mind of the Assistant Controller has to be ascertained primarily from the reasons as noted by the Assistant Controller. It is settled law that mere suspicion or review on the same facts is not permitted. Later judgment of the High Court or the Supreme Court can constitute a proper basis but in this case there is no such thing. The Assistant Controller, prima facie, acted on the footing that goodwill, if any, of Byculla Trading Co. is not includible as to have on death under Section
59. There is a proper basis for such conclusion. To reverse his finding, it will have to be assumed firstly, without any basis, that there was in fact goodwill at the time of dissolution; secondly, that such goodwill was given up without consideration ; and thirdly, that it has vested in some one. There is no basis for such assumption. The Assistant Controller had examined the issue properly before 1-1-1980 and held that there is no such property includible. This conclusion is correct on facts. Although the partnership did mention about the manner of distribution of goodwill, if any, at the time of dissolution, there was in fact no goodwill as seen from the dwindling profits, full retrenchment of employees, etc. Besides as held in Smt. Urmila's case (supra) even if this is held to be a case of retirement and continuation by others, there is no goodwill includible in terms of Section 9 as there is nothing to show absence or inadequacy of consideration, when the accounts were settled. The Assistant Controller's action in initiating action under Section 59 is thus without proper foundation. We see no material to justify the allegation of failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts.
17. It has been held in corresponding income-tax law in Jamna Lal Kabra v. ITO  69 ITR 461 (All.) that, it is not open to the ITO to refer to reasons other than those recorded by him. Similarly, in CM. Rajgharia v. ITO  98 ITR 486 (Pat.), it is observed as below :
... Income-tax Officer may be confined to those recorded reasons to support the assumption of jurisdiction....
In our opinion, in view of the fact that the assumption of jurisdiction is appealable, the above conclusion would apply mutatis mutandis to estate duty also even though the estate duty enactment may not have provision corresponding to Section 148(2).
18. The contention that once an assessment is validly reopened the Assistant Controller's powers are coterminous with those in the original assessment is not acceptable. The best that can be said is that as held in Maneklal Harilal Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd.'s case (supra) if an assessment is validly reopened, the fact that the recorded reason for reopening does not survive does not ipso facto oust the jurisdiction of the Assistant Controller. If at the time of reopening there was any information which would have been mentioned but which was in fact not mentioned for the purpose of Section 59(6) it may be permissible to examine the same. In the case before us, however, a good deal has been left to our imagination about the state of mind of the Assistant Controller who was allegedly enlightened on the basis of 'information' contained in the IAC's note dated 3-3-1980. We are left with an impression that as mentioned by the Appellate Controller in paragraph 5 (page 5 of the order) the IAC's note was primarily for further proper enquiries and not for any definite information.
19. We can now come to the IAC's D.O. No. 3-3-1980. The note no doubt shows that the Assistant Controller could have done better but does not provide 'information' either on facts or law on which Section 59 action could be founded. As already mentioned above, the will does not show any omission or understatement of value. The IAC's note does refer to the partnership deed dated 25-5-1973 but it is clear that the Assistant Controller had already considered the same before finalisation of original assessment on 1-1-1980. The IAC's note does make anxious enquiries as to whether the business of Byculla Trading Co. was discontinued and whether the assessments were distributed in specie. It is clear that the Assistant Controller did examine this aspect. Again the IAC's note does show that he had doubts as to whether the deceased did acquire prior title to the gold bonds before death. As bonds were produced and bore the endorsement of the Assistant Controller about grant of exemption, the mere fact that the payment was made on 2-8-1978 (according to the Assistant Controller the death took place on the night of 2-8-1978) cannot constitute information about the incorrectness of the exemption under Section 33(1)(p). The IAC's note then finds fault with the Assistant Controller for not referring the question of valuation of immovable properties to departmental Valuation Officer. This allegation of the IAC is based on his opinion that the corresponding wealth-tax assessments were not made properly. How could the Assistant Controller have come to such a conclusion ? The Assistant Controller' reliance on corresponding wealth-tax assessments as they existed on 1-1-1980 cannot, therefore, be said to be wrong. Any attempted revaluation in wealth-tax assessments cannot be considered sufficient information for sustaining action under Section 59. It appears that the accountable person had two valuation reports- one of Shri Apte and one of Shri Mogul Pawar. In his order dated 1-1-1980 the Assistant Controller has referred to both the reports and adopted a figure of Rs. 10,47,000 against about Rs. 7,23,000 shown by the accountable person. The accountable person was aggrieved by this valuation but in view of the Appellate Controller's order dated 21-7-1984 the accountable person cannot agitate the point again because the 1953 Act has no provision corresponding to Section 152(2) of the 1961 Act. On facts, it cannot, therefore, be said that any estate in the form of immovable property value has escaped assessment merely because the Assistant Controller did not make a reference to the departmental Valuation Officer.
20. The IAC then refers to the fact that the goodwill of the limited company was taken as per version of the accountable person without calling for the records of the company assessed in Bombay. But unless it is shown that the Bombay records do show a value different from that taken by the accountable person and the Assistant Controller, it cannot be said that there is any 'information' on the point for the purpose of Section 59. Computation of goodwill is a matter of opinion. Unless it is shown clearly that the valuation is in violation of established principles, one cannot discover 'information' for Section 59 purpose. Lastly, the IAC's observations regarding gold bonds were based on the records as they went to the IAC, i.e., without the information regarding the actual production of the bond with proper date of holding, etc. In view of the position now shown the IAC's observations regarding gold bonds also cannot constitute information for the purpose of Section 59.
21. The revaluation of shares attempted by the Assistant Controller in reassessment adopts all the figures in the original assessment except the deduction of 15 per cent which was allowed in the original assessment on account of similar allowance given under Rule 1D of the Wealth-tax Rules, 1957. It is not clear why the Assistant Controller is considered wrong in respect of the original valuation. It is settled law- CED v. J. Krishna Murthy  96 ITR 87 (Mys.)-that Rule 1D should be applied for estate duty valuation also. This action is thus also a change of opinion.
22. We thus find that after taking note of the I AC's note dated 3-3-1980 the conditions of Section 59(a) or 59(6) are not fulfilled. Accordingly, appeal is allowed.