**

College and P.G.Centre-Nellore town and Nellore District. The said application was sent to the Inspector, Endowments Department, Nellore in the reference 2nd cited for enquiring into the matter and submit his report. He enquired into the matter and submitted the report in the reference 3rd cited.

The Inspector in his report has stated as follows:

Sri Vakati Sanjeevi Setty was the founder of the subject institution. While he was alive he has executed a will dated 15.08.1980 through Notary. Nellore Distict appointed by Government of A.P. Sri Chinni Chinna Subbarayulu was appointed as Founder Trustee to the subject institution, after his death recognising his services and developments made to the subject institution to the stage of post graduation of the college. Sri C.C.Subbarayulu demised on 29.11.2002. During his tenure he made a lot of service to the college for its up lift and development at large. After close verification of Inspector's report, the following order is passed Late C.C.Subbarayulu father of the present applicant was acted as Founder Trustee as per the Will executed by Late Sri Vakati Sanjeevaiah Setty and thereon Sri C.C.Subbarayulu was appointed as Founder Trustee of the subject institution. After his demise his son Sri Chinni Subba Rao was authorised to act as Founder Trustee of the institution. The Statute of Sri C.C.Subbarayulu was installed in the premises of the subject institution on 15.10.2003 in Memory of his services rendered to the institution. There is no record except the Will executed by Sri Vakati Sanjeevaiah Setty on 15.08.1980. In the best development of the institution and Will executed by late Sri Vakati Sanjeevaiah Setty which was certified by the Notary on 21.07.1997. In view of said postition, Sri Chinni Subba Rao, s/o.Late Sri Chinni Chinna Subbarayulu Setty is declared as Member of the Founder Trustee U/s.15(3) of the Act 30/87 and as per the A.P.Ordinance No.7/2002, dt. 24.08.2002 issued by the Government to the said institution. The Inspector Endowments Department, Nellore is authorised to administer the oath of office and secrecy to Sri Chinni Subba Rao and report. Sd/-

Assistant Commissioner.

It is stated by the writ petitioner that the writ petitioner has been functioning as such being authorised under the provisions of the Act. It is also averred in para 4 of the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition that suo moto revision was taken up by the respondent No.2, the Regional Joint Commissioner of Endowments Department, Multi Zone-II Tirupathi under Section 92 of the Act as against the orders of respondent No.3 dated 13.05.2004 in R.P.No.10/04 and the petitioner participated in the enquiry and brought to the notice of respondent No.2 that his late father Sri C.C.Subbarayudu was appointed as Founder Trustee by virtue of the Will dated 15.08.1980 by the Founder Sri Vakati Sanjeevi Chetty of the subject institution. Respondent no.2, who had conducted the enquiry had passed ex parte orders on 26.12.2005 setting all the respondents in R.P.No.10/2004 ex parte and also set aside the orders dated 13.05.2004 of respondent No.3. The petitioner filed an application to set aside the ex parte order dated 26.12.2005 and permit the petitioner to take part in the enquiry. Since the same was not considered, the petitioner filed W.P.No.14301 of 2006. The said writ petition was disposed of by this Court, by order dated 29.12.2006 as hereunder:

"As the petitioner has filed an application dated 16.02.2006 seeking setting aside of the ex parte order, impugned herein, it would not be appropriate to this Court to go into the validity of the 2nd respondent's order in R.P.No.10 of 2004.

In the circumstances and on the view stated above, the writ petition is disposed of directing the 1st respondent to make appropriate administrative arrangements for appointing the Regional Joint Commissioner, Endowments Department, Multi Zone-II, Tirupati either by conferring appropriate power in an incharge officer, by posting or causing to be posted an officer as Regional joint Commissioner or alternatively the 1st respondent himself taking up the hearing of the application, as the power under Section 92 is the power of the Commissioner. The first respondent shall ensure that the application of the petitioner dated 16.02.2006 is disposed of expeditiously and preferably within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

The writ petition is disposed of at the stage of admission after hearing the learned Government Pleader for Endowment. In the circumstances no order as to costs.

It is further stated that respondent No.2 conducted an enquiry and heard the petitioner in pursuance of the order referred to above and respondent No.2 after considering the material available on record having found that there is no dispute with respect to the claim of declaration of the founder family member for the subject institution upheld and confirmed the orders dated 13.05.2004 of respondent No.3, declaring the petitioner as Member of the Founder Trustee and appointed the petitioner as Single Trustee under Section 15(3) of the Act. It is also stated that respondent No.4, who was a non party to the proceedings referred to supra appears to have filed a representation before the Minister for Endowments, A.P., Hyderabad, which was treated as revision petition by the respondent No.1 and respondent No.1 stayed the orders of respondent No.2. The said orders of respondent No.1 are ex parte orders passed behind the back of the writ petitioner and without making him as a party in the said proceedings. It is also averred that the impugned order made by the first respondent is without jurisdiction and without affording opportunity to the writ petitioner and also is bad in law.

It is also stated that under Section 87 of the Act the Deputy Commissioner has jurisdiction to inquire into and decide any dispute as to the question whether a person is a Founder or a Member of the family of the founder of an institution or endowment. The said power to decide a dispute if any is vested only with the Deputy Commissioner having jurisdiction. Against every decision of the Deputy Commissioner, an appeal lies to the District Court, under Section 88 of the Act. Respondent No.1 has no power and jurisdiction vested in it to entertain the alleged representation of respondent No.4 and stay the orders of respondent No.2 and 3. It is stated that respondent No.4 is no way concerned with the Trust or the subject institution nor he is a party to the proceedings before respondent Nos. 2 and 3. Respondent No.4 has purportedly acted with ulterior motive and approached the Minister. And as the consequence of the politically motivated action of respondent No.4, respondent No.1 without any power vested in it and without jurisdiction appears to have entertained the same as revision petition and passed impugned orders without any notice to the petitioner. It is further stated that a reading of the impugned proceedings show that, petitioner is not a party to the proceedings. Further it goes to show that the impugned orders are not even marked to the petitioner. Respondent No.4 with sinister motive has prevailed upon respondent No.1 to pass the impugned ex parte order. Further, impugned order does not even spell out any reasons whatsoever as to why respondent No.1 has stayed the orders of respondent No.2. It is stated that respondent No.4, who has nothing to do with the Trust or its affairs and who is not a party to the proceedings before respondent Nos.2 and 3 has obtained ex parte orders dated 12.07.2007 from respondent No.1 and has lodged a caveat before this Court which clearly shows that the whole exercise is malafide. It is also further averred that the father of the petitioner was appointed as a Founder Trustee in the year 1980 itself and his appointment as Founder Trustee was never disputed. Baseless allegations are now made by respondent No.4. Being his son the petitioner duly recognised as the member of Founder Trustee and therefore appointed as Trustee of the subject institution by the respondent No.3 under Section 15(3) of the Act. Respondent No.4 cannot question the same. He is neither the person aggrieved nor he is interested person in the affairs of the Trust. Respondent No.1 cannot entertain the alleged application of the 4th respondent which is not only arbitrary and illegal but also without jurisdiction. Further the alleged exercise of power by respondent No.1 is a colourable exercise of power for no justified reasons. It is also further stated that the petitioner is continuing as a Member of the Founder Trustee till today and as a Single Trustee of the institution and in such circumstances, being left with no other option, this writ petition has been filed praying for appropriate reliefs.

8. In the counter-affidavit filed by the first respondent specific stand had been taken that both the orders made by respondent No.3, the Assistant commissioner of Endowments and respondent No.2, the Regional Joint Commissioner, Endowments are illegal and without jurisdiction. The Regional Joint Commissioner can only exercise powers that are delegated to him by the Commissioner. There is no reference of the Commissioner confirming the decision of Assistant Commissioner or Regional Joint Commissioner in the petitioner's affidavit though it is mandatory. The Assistant Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner or Commissioner or Government have been appointing the trustees and recognizing the founder trustee depending upon the classification of the institution under Section 6(1)(a) or (b)(c) up to 2002. It is also stated that under Section 87(1)(h) of the Act which was introduced by way of amendment Act 27 of 2002 which came into force from 23.12.2002, it is the Deputy Commissioner, who is competent to entertain an application and decide as to 'whether a person is founder or a member from the family of founder of an institution of endowment'. The relevant portion of Section 87 reads as hereunder: (1) "The Deputy Commissioner having jurisdiction shall have the power, after giving notice in the prescribed manner to the person concerned, to enquire into and decide any dispute as to the question.

(a) to (g) omitted as not relevant.

(h) Whether a person is a founder or a member from the family of the founder of an Institution or

Endowment.

(2) The Commissioner may pending his decision under sub-section (1), pass such order as he deems fit for the administration of the property or custody of the money belonging to the institution or endowment.

(3) Every decision or order of the Deputy Commissioner on confirmation by the Commissioner under this section shall be published in the prescribed manner".

It is also further stated that this Court in (i) Inturi Venkayya and 3 others Vs Government of A.P & 4 others in W.P.No.26390 of 2003, on 24.12.2003 and (ii) Guru Prasad v. Commissioner of Endowments Department and 3 others, in W.P.No.25598 of 2003, on 9.12.2003, expressed the same view, so the Assistant Commissioner has no power to declare the petitioner as a member of family or the founder trustee. Though Joint Commissioner is a superior officer, he cannot usurp the functions of Deputy Commissioner. The order passed by the Deputy Commissioner under Section 87 is a quasi judicial order vide Teki Venkata Ratnam v. Deputy Commissioner of Endowments in AIR 2001 SC page No.2436. It has to be confirmed by the Commissioner under Section 87(2)(3) & (5). If any person is aggrieved by the orders of Deputy Commissioner under section 87 he may prefer an appeal to the District Judge under Section 88 of the Act. Further, the allegation that respondent No.4, who filed revision petition before the Government, is not a party to the enquiry conducted by the Assistant Commissioner and Joint Commissioner may be true . However as a citizen or as a person interested in proper running of the Trust, he is entitled to question the illegal orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner and Joint Commissioner. He is a person coming within the definition of "person having interest" within section 2(18) of the Act. Even otherwise the Government has power to call for the records suo moto, examine the same and pass orders under Section 93 of the Act.

Section 2 of the Act deals definitions and Section 2 (18) of the Act defines 'person having interest' includes-

(a) in the case of a math, a disciple of the math or a person of the religious persuasion to which the math belongs;

(b) in the case of a charitable institution or endowment or a religious institution other than a math or a religious endowment a person who is entitled to attend at or is in the habit of attending the performance of service, charity or worship connected with the institution or endowment or who is entitled to partake or is in the habit of partaking in the benefit of any charity or the distribution of gifts thereat;

(c) in the case of a specific endowment a person who is entitled to attend at or is in the habit of attending the performance of the service or charity or who is entitled to partake or is in the habit of partaking in the benefit of the charity:

Section 93 of the Act dealing with power of Government to call for records and pass orders, reads as hereunder:

"(1) The Government may either suo motu or on an application call for and examine the record of the Commissioner or any Deputy Commissioner or any Assistant Commissioner or any other Officer subordinate to them, or of any Executive Officer or any trustee of a charitable or religious institution or endowment, other than a math or specific endowment attached to a math in respect of any administrative or quasi-judicial decision taken or order passed under this Act, but not being a proceeding in respect of which a suit or an appeal or application, or a reference to Court is provided by this Act, to satisfy themselves as to the correctness, legality or propriety of such decision or order taken or passed, and if in any case, it appears to the Government that such decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for reconsideration, they may pass orders accordingly:

Provided that the Government shall not pass any order prejudicial to any party unless he has had an opportunity of making his representation. (2) The Government may stay the execution of any such decision or order pending the exercise of their powers under sub-section (1) in respect thereof.

(3) No application to the Government for the exercise of their power under this section shall be made in respect of any matters unless an application had already been made in respect of the same matter to the Commissioner under Section 92 and had been disposed of by him.

(4) Every application to the Government for the exercise of their powers under this section shall be made within ninety days from the date on which the decision or order to which the application relates was received by the applicant.

Further specific stand had been taken that the Government has power to call for records and examine the records of the Subordinate Officers, modify, anull, remit or permit for reconsideration and the Government has power to grant stay as well. Further, specific stand had been taken that the petitioner can file a petition to implead himself as party to the revision petition, if he had not already been impleaded.

9. The fourth respondent filed counter affidavit stating that he served as a member of Sri Sarvodaya Education Committee, which is a registered society bearing No.28/71 for a period of 6 years till the year 1996 and the said education committee is running a college in the name and style 'Sri Sarvodaya College' in Nellore Town. It is offering courses in Intermediate, Degree in Arts, Sciences and Commerce, Post Graduate courses in Arts and Commerce apart from imparting education for appearing in Open University. During his tenure, as a member of the education committee, the student strength of the college was more than 1500 per annum. It is further stated that originally, late Sri Vakati Sanjeevi Setty established a college partly with his funds and with the contributions raised from the general public. On his demise, several irregularities have taken place in the administration of the college. After the death of the above said Vakati Sanjeevi Setty, the father of the writ petitioner, one Sri C.C.Subbarayulu Chetty, styling himself as his nominee, acted as Treasurer and thereafter, as Secretary and Correspondent of Sri Sarvodaya College Committee. During his tenure, he committed several irregularities and misappropriated huge amounts belonging to the college committee. Therefore, the Educational Committee was constrained to file O.S.No.75 of 1997 on the file of the I Additional District Judge, Nellore for recovery of Rs.5,15,556/- with subsequent interest thereon. The learned I Additional District Judge, Nellore was pleased to decree the suit for a sum of Rs.2,30,400/- having found that he misappropriated the said amounts belonging to the Education Committee. The said Subbarayulu Chetty preferred an appeal in A.S.No.200 of 2003 before this Court and the said appeal is pending. Pending the appeal, the father of the 4th respondent Subbarayulu Chetty died on 29.11.2000 and the writ petitioner herein as his legal representative stepped into the shoes of his late father and he has to discharge the decretal amount from the estate of late C.C.Subbarayulu Chetty. In order words, there is conflict of interest between the writ petitioner and the institution. Hence the petitioner cannot be permitted to act as founder member. Further, it is stated that during his tenure as member of the Education Committee, 4th respondent put in all the efforts for the development of the institution and the 4th respondent is interested in the welfare of the institution. Unfortunately, on account of misdeeds of the earlier managements, during the tenure of the father of the writ petitioner the student strength of the college has drastically come down and presently there are only 150 students studying in the college. It is also stated that this respondent came to know that the petitioner herein managed to get an order from the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments, Nellore, the 3rd respondent herein recognizing him as a member of the founder's family of the institution in his proceedings Reference.No.1408/2004 Ex.A.1, dated 13.05.2004. The 3rd respondent seems to have passed an order basing on the report said to have been submitted by the Inspector of Endowments, Nellore stating that Sri Vakati Sanjeevi Setty executed a Will dated 15.08.1990 appointing the father of the writ petitioner as the founder member and that the said will was certified by the Notary on 21.07.1997 and on his demise, the writ petitioner sponsored plastering works to the rooms, by spending a sum of Rs.40,000/-. It is also stated that as soon as the said order was passed, the Regional Joint Commissioner, Endowments Department, Multi Zone-II Tirupathi, took up suo moto enquiry by invoking the powers under Section 92 of the Act having been satisfied that the reasoning adopted by the 3rd respondent was illegal and unsustainable. The same was numbered as R.P.No.10 of 2004. The Regional Joint Commissioner was also passed an interim order on 17.07.004 staying the order recognizing the appointment of the petitioner as founder trustee and directed not to proceed further with the administration of the institution by the writ petitioner. A copy of the same is filed herewith.

It is further averred in para 8 that the second respondent, having taken up the matter as suo moto, while ordering notice to the respondents herein and called for the records from the file of the 3rd respondent. Since there was no representation on behalf of the writ petitioner, despite notice, he was set-ex parte and orders were passed on 26.12.2005 setting aside the order of the 3rd respondent dated 13.05.2004 recognising the writ petitioner as founder trustee. It appears that the writ petitioner seems to have filed a petition for restoration on 16.02.2006. The second respondent straight away proceeded to dispose of the R.P. even without notice to other respondents on the restoration application and even without restoring the R.P. The second respondent basing on a counter affidavit said to have been filed by the petitioner stating that the founder late Vakati Sanjeevi Setty executed a Will dated 15.08.1980, his father was appointed as Founder Trustee and he made developments to the College and on his demise, he sponsored plastering works in the rooms by spending Rs.40,000/-. As if, what are all stated in the counter affidavit was sacrosanct, even without holding any enquiry, the 2nd respondent confirmed the order passed by the 3rd respondent recognizing the writ petitioner as the founder trustee in his order dated 9.5.2007 in R.P.No.10 of 2004. It is also stated that in the interest of the Institution, 4th respondent filed a revision petition before the Government of Andhra Pradesh under Section 93(1) of the Act duly impleading the respondents 1 and 2, the Inspector of Endowments and the writ petitioner as a respondents in the said revision petition. The 4th respondent also filed an application under Section 93(2) of the Act seeking stay of the order pending the revision. The Government while admitting the writ petition and calling for the records stayed the impugned orders until further orders. The fact remains the writ petitioner has not been acting as a founder trustee since the year 2004 and the order of the 3rd respondent recognizing him as a founder trustee has not been implemented till date. Further, it is averred that there are no grounds much less valid grounds are made out in the writ petition. It is also stated that the allegation that during the life time of Sri Vakati Sanjeevi Chetty, he executed a will on 15.08.1980 appointing Chinni Chinni Subbaryudu as founder trustee is denied. The further allegation that the said C.C.Subbarayudu rendered service to the college and developed the same is denied. On the other hand the civil Court found that the said C.C.Subbarayudu was guilty of misappropriating the college funds and therefore grant a decree for the recovery of Rs.2,30,400/- in O.S.No.75 of 1997 on the file of the I Additional District Judge, Nellore. The petitioner secured an order from the 3rd respondent recognizing him as founder trustee for extraneous considerations. The petitioner is not entitled to be appointed as founder trustee as he or his father never founded the Institution nor contributed for its development. Late Vakati Sanjevi Chetty left behind his children. The purported will must have been invented for seeking the appointment of a founder trustee. His father was never recognized by any competent authority as founder trustee. The allegation in para 3 that the petitioner has been functioning as founder trustee is denied. It is also further stated that second respondent passed an order in R.P.No.10 of 2004 just before his retirement. Further specific stand had been taken that a statutory revision was filed before the Government duly impleading the petitioner as 4th respondent. Further, the allegations made in para 7 had been denied and the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner under Section 87(h) of the Act and the suo moto revisional power of the Government under Section 93 of the Act and appeal to District Court under Section 88 of the Act also had been referred to. Further, it is stated that the 4th respondent prayed for leave to file revision before the first respondent and the same is pending.

It is also averred in para 14 of the counter affidavit of Respondent No.4 that as a matter of fact the founder late Vakati Sanjeevi Chetty was acting as a founder trustee till his death in August, 1981. As a matter of fact late Vakati Sanjeevi Chetty died in the month of August, 1981 after executing his last will and testament which was duly registered and acted upon appointing his grandson one Sri K.C.Kumar as the member of the committee of the institution. A resolution to that effect was passed by the committee of the Institution on 13.09.1981. But the above said K.C.Kumar subsequently resigned from the said committee and opted out. The concept of founder trustee was envisaged for the first time by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pannalal Bansilal Patil's case reported in AIR 1996 Supreme Court 1023. The Legislature in acted amendment Act 27 of 2002 by amending section 17 of the Act defining 'Founder'. In the same amendment Act Section 87 has been amended conferring jurisdiction on the Deputy Commissioner of Endowments to adjudicate the dispute about founder trusteeship. The amendment came into force w.e.f 23.12.2002. Hence, the Assistant Commissioner has no jurisdiction to decide as to the person entitled to be recognized either as a founder or member belonging into founder's family. Therefore appointing the petitioner's father as founder trustee in the year 1980 is invented for the purpose of this litigation. Neither the petitioner nor his father are entitled to be recognized as founder trustees. The institution being a charitable institution established for the benefit of the people in public interest any person can challenge the illegal order obtained by the petitioner for extraneous considerations by pressing into service the invented and fabricated will. Even otherwise also once the office is hereditary trusteeship has been abolished under Section 16 of Act 30 of 1987, even the founder has no right to appoint a third party for being recognized as a member belonging to his family. After narrating certain other further factual details, the 4th respondent prays for dismissal of the writ petition.

10. Section 92 of the Act deals with power of the Commissioner to call for records and pass orders, and the said provision reads as hereunder: "(1) The Commissioner may either suo motu or on application, call for and examine the record of any Deputy Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner, or of any other Officer subordinate to him or of any Executive Officer or any trustee of a charitable or religious institution or endowment, other than a math or a specific endowment attached to a math in respect of any administrative or quasi- judicial decision taken or order passed under this Act, but not being a proceeding in respect of which a suit or an appeal or application or reference to a court is provided by this Act to satisfy himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of such decision or order taken or passed, and if in any case, it appears to the Commissioner that such decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for reconsideration, he may pass orders accordingly.

(2) The Commissioner shall not pass any order prejudicial to any party under sub-section (1), without giving him an opportunity for making representation.

(3) The Commissioner may stay the execution of any decision or order of the nature referred to in sub-section (1) pending the exercise of his powers under the said sub-section in respect thereof.

(4) Every application to the Commissioner for the exercise of his powers under this section shall be preferred within ninety days from the date on which the order or proceeding to which the application relates was received by the applicant.

Section 2(6) of the Act defines 'Commissioner' as in this Act unless the context otherwise requires 'Commissioner' means:

"the Commissioner and the Additional Commissioner appointed under sub- section (1) of Section 3 and includes every officer who for the time being exercises the powers and performs the functions of a Commissioner under this Act or the rules made thereunder in respect of any charitable or religious institution or endowment as specified in sub-section (5) of Section 3". Section 3 of the Act deals with appointments etc., of Commissioner, Additional Commissioner, Regional Joint Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner, and Sub-Section (5) of Section 3 reads as hereunder: "The Government may direct the Commissioner, Additional Commissioner and every Regional Joint Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner appointed under sub-section(1) to exercise the powers and perform the functions conferred on or entrusted to the Commissioner, Additional Commissioner or Regional Joint Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner, as the case may be, by or under this Act in respect of charitable or religious institutions or endowments.

Section 9 of the Act dealing with powers and functions of Regional Joint Commissioner, reads as hereunder:

"Subject to the administrative control of the Commissioner a Regional Joint Commissioner shall exercise such powers and perform such functions of the Commissioner as may, from time to time, be determined by the Government in respect of institutions and endowments in the region and any order passed or proceeding taken by a Regional Joint Commissioner in the exercise of such powers and the performance of such functions shall be deemed to be an order of the Commissioner for the purpose of this Act.

11. Certain submissions were made in relation to the exercise of suo motu power by the second respondent-Regional Joint Commissioner, Endowments and whether a revision would lie as against such order to the first respondent, the Government. Strong reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in K. MADUSUDANA RAO v. SREESEETHARAMA CHANDRASWAMY VARI DEVASTHANAM, BHADRACHALAM1 wherein a Division Bench while dealing with Sections 82 and 83 of the Act of 1966 held that since the aggrieved party had a right to file a revision petition before the Commissioner against an order of the Executive Officer, it will be a bar to his filing a revision petition direct before the Government under Section 83(1). Any order made pending revision petition filed by the aggrieved party, which order is not traceable to the exercise of suo motu powers vested in the Government under Section 83(1) cannot be sustained.

Reliance was also placed on SREE SEETHARAMACHANDRASWAMY VARI DEVASTHANAM, BHADRACHALAM, REP. BY SIR MULLAPUDI HARICHANDRAPRASAD, CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF TRUSTEES v. THE GOERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REPRESENTED BY DEPUTY SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT REVENUE (ENDOWMENTS-II) DEPARTMENT2. It is needless to say that this matter was carried by way of writ appeal and the Division Bench had delivered the decision already referred to supra.

Reliance was also placed in C. KANNAIAH CHETTY v. THE GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH3. In KALLURAM ALIAS MUNNALAL v. THE COMMISSIONER OF ENDOWMENTS, A.P. HYDERABAD4, the Division Bench observed that sub-Section (3) of Section 93 is not a bar for any person to invoke the jurisdiction of the State Government in respect of an order passed by the Commissioner of Endowments. So far as the orders passed by officers who are subordinate to the Commissioner are concerned, unless the revisional jurisdiction of the Commissioner is invoked in respect of those orders, no person can approach the State Government by way of a revision under Section 93(1) of the Act.

12. The question of competency or incompetency of the second respondent to make an order in exercise of suo motu powers and also the relevant statutory provisions under Section 3(5) and Section 9 of the Act need not detain by this Court any further or any longer for the reasons specified intra. Section 3 of the Act already had been referred to supra. It is no doubt true that the leave application filed along with the revision before the first respondent by the fourth respondent is said to be pending. On a careful reading of the order made by the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments, Nellore, which had already been specified supra, in the light of the clear provision under Section 87(1)(h) of the Act specified above and also the nature of the order, which was made and in the light of a clear language of the provision, this Court is of the considered opinion that the concerned Deputy Commissioner, Endowments alone is competent to make such an order even if Section 87(1)(h) of the Act is read along with Section 15(3) of the Act aforesaid. There cannot be any split up of the order as such since as far as the enquiry relating to the founder member is concerned, the competent authority is the Deputy Commissioner of Endowments, within whose jurisdiction an institution may fall.

13. In VENKATA RATNAM v. COMMISSIONER, ENDOWMENT5 it was observed at para 7 as hereunder:

"Section 87 of the Act in Chapter XII relating to enquiries, to the extent it is relevant for the present purpose reads:-"87. Power of Deputy Commissioner to decide certain disputes and matters:- 1) The Deputy Commissioner having jurisdiction shall have the power, after giving notice in the prescribed manner to the person concerned, to enquire into and decide any dispute as to the question (A) Whether an institution or endowment is a charitable institution or endowment; (B) whether an institution or endowment is a religious institution or endowment;(c) to (g)... (2) to (4)..(5) Any decision or order of the Deputy Commissioner deciding whether an institution or endowment is not a public institution or endowment shall not take effect unless such decision or order is confirmed by an order of the Commissioner; (6) The presumption in respect of matters covered by Cs (a), (b), (c), (d) arid (e) in sub section (1) is that the institution or the endowment is public one and that the burden of proof in all such cases shall lie on the person claiming the institution or the endowment to be private or the property or money to be other than that of a religious endowment or specific endowment as the case may be. "section 160 states as follows:-" 160. Overriding effect of the Act:- (1) notwithstanding any compromise, agreement, scheme, judgment, decree or order of a Court, Tribunal or other authority or any custom or usage governing any charitable or religious institution or endowment or Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanams, the provisions of this Act shall with effect on and from, the date of the commencement of this Act; prevail in so far as they relate to the matters governed by the corresponding provisions in any such compromise, agreement, scheme, judgment, decree or order or any custom or usage and such corresponding provision shall thereafter have no effect.(2)....

14. Strong reliance was placed in PRATHI SUBBAIAH CHETTY v. GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH REVENUE (ENDOWMENTS) DEPARTMENT6. In G. RAJENDRANATH GOUD v. PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, ENDOWMENTS DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH 7 The learned Judge of this Court at para 20 observed as hereunder: "The list of subject matters into which an enquiry can be conducted by the Deputy Commissioner is exhaustive. When a dispute arises whether a new endowment is a charitable or religious institution, whether such institution is religious institution, whether any property is an endowment to a charitable institution, whether any institution or endowment is wholly or partly secular or religious character are core subjects in relation to which a dispute often arises in the context of religious and charitable institutions. Apart from that the Deputy Commissioner is competent to decide all disputes in relation to the property endowed to a charitable or religious institution. A question as to whether any person is entitled to honours or perquisites in any charitable or religious institution can also be decided by the Deputy Commissioner. By reason of the amendment Act of 2002, the Deputy Commissioner is now competent to enquire into the question whether a person is a founder or member of founder's family. While conducting enquiries, the Deputy Commissioner is required to follow the procedure applicable under Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and apply the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (see Section 149). As per Section 88 of the Act, the orders of the Deputy Commissioner passed under Section 87 are made subject to an appeal by the aggrieved person to the District Judge and Section 91 provides for revision to the High Court against any order passed by the Court and the orders of the District Court. Though Sections 90, 92, 93 and 94 provide for an appeal, revision and review, the orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner under Section 87 are not made appealable or revisable or reviewable by the Departmental authorities and the Government. The power conferred by the Deputy Commissioner to conduct enquiry duly following the provisions of CPC and Evidence Act is essentially the power to adjudicate the rights of the person or a group of persons in relation to or in connection with a charitable or religious institution or endowment. It is judicial power though it is exercised by a statutory authority i.e., Deputy Commissioner appointed under Section 3(1) of the Act. That is the reason why the orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner under Section 87 are outside the purview of departmental appeal though some of the orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner in other capacity are made subject to appeal under Section 90 and revision under Sections 92 and 93. Presumably, for this reason that the Government thought it fit to confer the power on the Deputy Commissioner under Section 87 to enquire and adjudicate into the question whether a person is founder or a member of the founder's family. It may be mentioned that the right to establish a charitable or religious institution and the right to administer such institution is a very valuable right guaranteed by Articles 25 and 26 of Constitution of India and therefore in the opinion of this Court the legislature identified the same as a matter, which requires enquiry judicially.

15. Reliance was also placed in ANDAL RAGHAVAN v. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, ENDOWMENTS DEPARTMENT, KAKINADA8, and at para 10, it was observed as hereunder: "The declaration of a person as founder or member of the founder's family under section 87(1)(h) of the Act by the Deputy Commissioner of Endowments or by any competent authority before coming into force of Section 87(1)(h), is altogether different from the appointment of a qualified founder or a qualified member of the founder's family as trustee under Section 17(1) of the Act (see G. Rajendranadh Goud v. State of A.P., 2006 (1) ALD 705). Every founder or member of the founder's family cannot be said to have an enforceable right for being appointed as a trustee or Chairman of Trust Board. As a matter of course, such person has to fulfil the qualifications in Section 18 of the Act and Rule 8 of the Rules and should not incur disqualification under Section 19 of the Act. Further even in a case where the number of applications received by the competent authority is equal to the number of trustees to be appointed, even then no applicant can be said to have any right for appointment. The antecedents of all the applicants got to be verified by the subordinate officers and the verification report has a bearing on the exercise of the power by the competent authority. Therefore unless and until the application is made by the person claiming to be founder or member of the founder's family giving all the details in Form No.II and unless and until the antecedents of such person are verified by the Verification Officer, such person cannot be appointed as a trustee. Rule 7 of the Rules clearly lays down that, "competent authority shall scrutinize the applications along with the report of the Verifying Officer and pass orders appointing trustees". Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is no necessity for the founder or member of the founder's family to apply in Form No.II under Rule 5(1) of the Rules, after publication of notice in Form No.1, cannot be countenanced. If the same is accepted and a member of the founder's family is appointed without there being an application, it would lead to number of complications besides showing up problems and difficulties in a case where there are more than one recognized member from the founder's family".

16. Reliance was also placed in K. SUSHEELA v. COMMISSIONER OF ENDOWMENTS, HYDERABAD9. In INTURI VENKAIAH v. GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADSH, REVENUE (ENDOWMENTS) S.4 DEPARTMENT, SECRETARIAT, HYDERABAD, REP.BY ITS SECRETARY in W.P.No.26390 of 2003, it was observed as hereunder;

"The impugned order cannot be said to suffer from any vice. After Amendment of the Act, by Act No.27 of 2002 clause (h) has been inserted in sub-section (1) of Section 87 . Be it noted, section 87 confers powers on the Deputy Commissioner to decide certain disputes and any decision of the Deputy Commissioner has to be confirmed by the Commissioner. Under Section 87(1)(h) of the Act, a dispute as to whether a person is member of the founder's family is to be decided by the Deputy Commissioner. The Assistant Commissioner or any authority has no power to decide the question. In a recent unreported judgment in W.P.No.25598 of 2003 dated 9.12.2003, I considered this aspect on the matter. The Assistant Commissioner decided the dispute in favour of respondents 2 and 3 some time in April, 2002 much before the Amendment Act came into the force. The same, in my opinion, does not make any difference. The statute or the rules made there under, did not provide specifically for recognition of a member of the founder's family for being appointed as Chairman of the Board of Trustees. Therefore, by reason of the statutory recognition of such right, any administrative instructions issued earlier to the amendment conferring powers on Assistant Commissioner cannot be said to have conferred any rights on respondents 2 and

3. In that view of the matter, the submission of the learned counsel for respondents 2 and 3 Sri N. Gurugopal that the amendment is only prospective, cannot be accepted.

17. In GURU PRASAD v. COMMISSIONER OF ENDOWMENTS DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH, TILAK ROAD, HYDERABAD in W.P.No.25598 of 2003 it was observed as hereunder:

" After perusing Section 87(1)(h), there cannot be any doubt about the legal position. Even though the application was made in 1997, it was decided on 30.09.2003, at which point of time, the Assistant Commissioner is not competent authority to decide whether a person is a founder or a member of the founder's family. For this short reason, the impugned order is set aside and the petitioner is given liberty to approach the Deputy Commissioner of Endowments having jurisdiction and file application under Section 87(1)(h) of the Act, which shall be decided within a period of four weeks after such presentation of the application.

18. In BANDA RAGHAVENDRA RAO v. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, ENDOWMENTS, VIJAYAWADA, KRISHNA DISTRICT in W.P.No.3532 of 2006, dated 11.09.2007, this Court, at para 10 observed as hereunder:

"In G.RAJENDRANATH GOUND V/s. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ORS10[1], while dealing with Section 87 (1) (h), 15, 17 (1) and 20 of A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 held that when a member or members of founder's family are not determined or declared, it is only Deputy Commissioner, who has to conduct enquiry and any other authority, be it Government, Commissioner of Endowments or Assistant Commissioner cannot have any jurisdiction to conduct such enquiry contemplated under section 87 (1) (h) of the Act. The learned Judge of this Court observed at para nos. 28, 29, 33 and also 35 as hereunder:

Reading Section 17 with appointment Rules, it becomes clear the nature of enquiry by the competent authority is only to see whether any aspirant incurs any disqualification and whether such a person is suitable and eligible for being appointed as trustee. The very nature of power exercised under Sections 15, 17 and 20 read with the relevant Rules would leave no doubt that the functions are purely of administrative in nature, no quasi judicial functions are involved. Indeed the Rules do not even contemplate issue of a notice before an application is rejected and the statute does not confer any right on any person for being appointed as a matter of right as trustee of a temple or institution. That is the reason why Explanation I under Section 17(1) employs the term "recognized" while dealing with preferential right of a person or a member of the founder's family. Explanation II employs terms "declared or recognized". Who "declares" that a person is founder or member of family of founder?

Section 87(1)(h) of the Act uses the phrase "to enquire into and decide any dispute as to the question whether a person is a founder or a member from the family of the founder of an institution or endowment". Therefore, the provision dealing with enquiries contemplates enquiry to decide the question as to whether a person is a founder of the institution or not, whereas the Explanation I to Section 17(1) of the Act employs the phrase "a person who has founded the institution and recognized as such by the competent authority" to be given preference in the appointment as a member of Board of Trustees. The distinction in the language employed is a clear indication that if the dispute arises as to who is the person or persons who are members of the family of the founder or a founder, the enquiry has to be necessarily conducted by the Deputy Commissioner of Endowments. At the time of appointment, unless and until such person who is determined and declared to be a founder or a member of the family of the founder, is declared or recognized as such founder or member of the founder's family, no purpose would be served. What is the scope of "recognition" at the time of appointment of Board of Trustees? As noticed hereinabove the Explanation II to Section 17(1) of the Act describes children, grand children in agnatic line of succession as members of the family of the founder. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 17 casts an obligation on the appointing authority to appoint either the founder or one of the members of the family of the founder to be trustees in the Board. Whereas Explanation I requires a founder or a member of the family of a founder to be 'recognised' by the appointing authority. To reconcile Section 87(1)(h) of the Act, which confers power on Deputy Commissioner to decide question as to who is member of the founder's family and Section 17(1) which empowers the appointing authority to 'recognise', one should adopt the contextual interpretation while interpreting both the provisions separately and should adopt harmonious construction of both the provisions to avoid any conflict. Doing so, this Court is of considered opinion that when there is a dispute among the members of the founder, as to who is or who are members of the founder's family, an enquiry has to be necessarily conducted by the Deputy Commissioner of Endowments under Section 87(1)(h) of the Act. In a situation where this exercise has already been completed either before the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Pannalal Bansilal v State of A.P., (supra) or while the circular issued by the Commissioner of Endowments was in operation or before coming into force of the amended Section 87(1)(h), unless and until such person or persons are recognized by the appointing authority under Section 17(1) (under both the Explanations), no such person can be appointed as a member of the Board of Trustees. In the event of 'recognition' of all successors of the founder as members of the founder's family, it is for the appointing authority to recognize one of them subject to fulfilling the qualifications as one of the members of the family of the founder for being appointed as a trustee. Therefore, the conclusion is that when a member or members of the founder's family are not determined or declared, it is only the Deputy Commissioner who has to conduct enquiry and any competent authority - be it Government; Commissioner of Endowments or Deputy commissioner or Assistant Commissioner - cannot have any jurisdiction to conduct such enquiry contemplated under Section 87(1)(h) of the Act.

Before coming into force of 1987 Act, and after coming into force of 1987 Act, the petitioner herein filed applications being O.A.No.1 of 1997 (under Section 77(c)(c) of 1966 Act) and O.A.No.40 of 1997 (under Section 87(1)(e) of 1987 Act). No doubt, in the orders passed in these two original applications, there are certain observations made which might be construed as conferring some benefit on the petitioner. The fact is that so far no enquiry has been conducted by the competent authority i.e., Deputy Commissioner of Endowments or the Government before coming into force of the amendment to Section 87(1) or after coming into force of that provision. Therefore, in the background facts of this case, the notice of enquiry issued by the Commissioner is without jurisdiction and to that extent the submission of the petitioner's counsel commends itself to this Court. But the other submission that the Government alone should conduct enquiry to decide the question as to who among the four sons of Jagannath Goud is a question which squarely falls within the ambit of Section 87(1)(h) of the Act and therefore necessarily the jurisdictional Deputy Commissioner of Endowments alone has competence to decide the question. The order of this Court dated 03.08.2005 cannot be understood as directing an incompetent authority to conduct enquiry under Section 87(1)(h) of the Act.

In the result, for the above reasons, this Court declares that the Commissioner of Endowments is incompetent to conduct any enquiry under Section 87(1)(h) of the Act. He is therefore directed to send back the entire material including the applications made by the third respondent herein seeking recognition as a member of the founder's family, to the Deputy Commissioner of Endowments concerned immediately so as to enable the latter to complete the enquiry after giving notice to the rival claimants, within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

19. In the peculiar facts and circumstances, no doubt, it is a case where on some representation made by respondent No.4, the same was treated as revision by the first respondent and an interim order was made. It is also true that the leave application said to have been made by Respondent No.4, preferred to the Government also is said to be pending. It is also true that the said order made by the first respondent-Government alone had been challenged in the present writ petition. But, however, in the light of the facts and circumstances and also the nature of the order made by the third respondent-Assistant Commissioner of Endowments, Nellore and also in the light of Section 87(1)(h) of the Act referred to supra, this Court is satisfied that the initial order made by the Assistant Commissioner Endowments, Nellore, respondent No.3 itself is one without jurisdiction since respondent No.3 is not the competent authority to make such an order. Even if the impugned order is not in accordance with law when the effect of touching an order would result in reviving of the other illegal orders, the writ Courts normally would not lean in favour of such revival of the illegal orders made by quasi judicial authorities of the lower hierarchy.

20. Hence, taking the over all facts and circumstances into consideration, in view of the fact that the very initial order made by Respondent No.3 being without jurisdiction, it is needless to say that the other orders of either respondent No.2 or respondent No.1 may not have the legs to stand and accordingly, all these orders are liable to be set aside. Certain submissions were made that there are no rival claims. It is needless to say that this aspect also may have to be gone into only by the competent authority as ordained by the provisions of the statute. In this view of the matter, let all these records be transmitted to the concerned Deputy Commissioner, Endowments. However, in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances, without expressing any further opinion, apart from the records be transmitted to the concerned Deputy Commissioner, Endowments, it is also made clear that the writ petitioner is at liberty to file appropriate application in this regard in accordance with Rules governing the field, within a period of two weeks from today and in the event of such application being made, let the concerned Deputy Commissioner, Endowments having jurisdiction decide such application also while deciding the question in controversy in the light of the records, which are being transmitted, within a period of four weeks thereafter.

21. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is disposed of. No order as to costs.

?1 1982(2) ALT 3 (NRC)

2 1980 (1) ALT 157

3 1979 (1) ALT 298.

4 1991(II) ALT 673

5 AIR 2001 Supreme Court-2436 equivalent to 2001 SCC 7-106, 6 2001 ALT 3-13 equivalent to 2001 ALD 3-61.

7 2006 ALT-2-115 equivalent to 2006-ALD-1-705.

8 2007(5)ALD 661

9 2000-ALT-5-366 equivalent to 2000-ALD-5-544.

10[1] ) 2006 (1) ALD-705

*THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.S. NARAYANA

W.P.No. 20357 of 2007

11-10-2007

B. Chenna Reddy s/o Nagi Reddy, aged about 41 years, Chairman, Agricultural Market Committee,Hyderabad, R/o.. 16-11-740/1/1/D, Gaddiannaram, Dilsukhnagar,Hyderabad.

The State of Andhra Pradesh, rep. by its Prl. Secretary, Agriculture & Cooperation (AGRL.MKTG.I) Department, Secretariat, Saifabad, Hyderabad.

2. The Commissioner & Director of Agricultural Marketing, A.P.Hyderabad,

3.The Agricultural Market Committee, Hyderabad, New Osmangunj, Hyderabad, rep. by its Secretary

4. Sri G. Balakrishna Yadav s/o not known to petitioner, Vice Chairman & Incharge Chariman, Agrl. Market Committee, New Osman Gunj, Hyderabad

5. Andhra Pradesh Grain & Seeds Merchants Association, office of 16-10-1/164, First Floor, Sri Krupa Agrl. Market Complex, Malakpet, Hyderabad, rep. by its Secretary.

Counsel for petitioner : Sri K.R. Prabhakar.

Counsel for respondents 1 & 2 : G.P. for Agriculture.

Counsel for RespondentNo.3 Sri V.V.Narayana Rao.

Counsel for Respondent No.4 Sri T. Kumar Babu.

Counsel for Respondent No.5 : Vedula Venkataranama.

:ORDER:

The matter is coming up for admission.

2. When the matter came up for admission on 27-09-2007, in the light of the orders dated 07-08-2007 and 24-09-2007, since in both the orders the representation made by the Andhra Pradesh Grain & Seeds Merchants Association had been referred to and since the orders were made at the instance of the said Association, on the allegations made by the said Association, this Court was of the opinion that the said Association is a necessary party. The implead applications were filed and respondents 4 and 5 were impleaded.

3. When the matter came up on 01-10-2007, Sri T. Kumar Babu, learned counsel representing the 4th respondent and Sri Vedula Venkataramana, learned counsel representing the 5th respondent requested time on the ground that they are entering appearance on behalf of respondents 4 and 5 respectively and hence this Court directed the matter to appear in the list on 04-10-2007. The matter was heard on 04-10-2007.

4. Sri S. Ramchander Rao, learned Senior Counsel representing the writ- petitioner, had taken this Court through the contents of the affidavit filed in support of the writ-petition and also the stand taken in the counter affidavit filed by the 5th respondent and would maintain that though normally in a matter relating to suspension pending enquiry, the Courts may be reluctant to interfere, this is a peculiar case, where on the self-same allegations made against the Chairman, Agricultural Market Committee, Hyderabad, an order was made by the Commissioner and Director of Agricultural Marketing, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, in Lr. No. 5395/2006, dated 07-08-2007 and the Government having referred to the said order dated 07-08-2007 as second reference made G.O.Rt. No. 1241, dated 24-09-2007 repeating the same allegations keeping the writ-petitioner under suspension for a period of three months with immediate effect under Section 6(A) of A.P. (Andhra Pradesh Produce & Livestock) Market Act, 1966, (in short 'the Act') pending further enquiry into the matter and in this view of the matter, such power could not have been exercised by the Government for the reason that no further enquiry could be proceeded with, in the light of the order already made by the Commissioner and Director of Agricultural Marketing, A.P. Hyderabad dated 07-08-2007. Learned Senior Counsel also would contend that even on a careful reading of Section 6(A) of the Act, this is not a case where the Government could have made such an order since none of the ingredients expected to be satisfied, to attract Section 6(A) of the Act, had been satisfied in the present case. Learned Senior Counsel also would contend that the suspension pending enquiry, at the best, could be made only when the incumbent had willfully omitted or refused to carry out their orders or abuse his position or powers vested with him and his further continuance in the office would be detrimental to the interests of the Market Committee. Learned Senior Counsel also would contend that the enquiry conducted by the Joint Director of Marketing would reveal mala fide intention and illegal activities of the Association, hence, it is definitely an arbitrary action. Learned Senior Counsel also pointed out to the references made in these orders and also the contents of these orders. Learned Senior Counsel also placed strong reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in UNION OF INDIA V. K.D. PANDEY AND ANOTHER1.

5. Learned Government Pleader for Agriculture representing respondents 1 and 2 had taken this Court through the Section 6(A) of the Act and in all fairness would submit that, no doubt, the order made by the 2nd respondent dated 07-08- 2007 referred to the self-same allegations. But the learned Government Pleader for Agriculture, however, would contend that, it appears from the records that such observations were made by the 2nd respondent in the light of Lr.Rc. No. 1819/2006, dated 02-07-2007 of the Joint Director of Marketing, Hyderabad (evidently the date appears to be a mistake). Learned Government Pleader for Agriculture also had pointed to the concluding portion of the order dated 07-08-2007 wherein it was specified that, in view of the above, the Government may take a view and issue further necessary orders in this matter. Hence, the learned Government Pleader for Agriculture would maintain that it cannot be said that the 2nd respondent closed the enquiry finally and in the light of the same, the contention advanced by the counsel for the writ-petitioner that G.O.Rt. No. 1214, dated 24-09-2007, is without authority, cannot be sustained. Even if the allegations are self-same allegations, the Government is empowered to take its own decision in this regard in the light of Section 6(A) of the Act aforesaid. Learned Government Pleader for Agriculture also would maintain that this being a suspension pending enquiry, at the best, the enquiry may be expedited and nothing beyond thereto can be done at this stage.

6. Sri V.V. Narayana Rao, learned counsel representing the 3rd respondent, also made submissions on similar lines as that of the learned Government Pleader for Agriculture.

7. Sri T. Kumar Babu, learned counsel representing the 4th respondent, would maintain that the writ petition itself is not maintainable, since neither the fundamental right nor the legal right of the writ-petitioner had been infringed. Learned counsel also had taken this Court through the language of Section 6(A) of the Act and made elaborate submissions on the expression "opinion". Learned counsel would maintain that in forming an opinion there need not be any enquiry. Even otherwise, the learned counsel would submit that in the light of the subsequent events, since the allegations made by the Association may have to be gone into, at this stage, no interference is warranted. Even otherwise, the learned counsel would contend that this being a case falling under the realm of administration, in the light of the limitations imposed by several judicial precedents in the exercise of judicial review on this Court, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. Learned counsel also placed strong reliance on certain decisions and also certain dictionary meanings to substantiate his submissions.

8. Sri Vedula Venkataramana, learned counsel representing the 5th respondent, would maintain that though the relief in the writ petition is in the form of a direction, virtually, it is a writ of Certiorari to quash the order. Learned counsel also had taken this Court through the contents of the counter affidavit and had referred to the relevant paras. Learned counsel also would submit that the power of the Director of Marketing being concurrent even as per the language of Section 6(A) of the Act, it cannot be said that the Government has no power at all to make an order of suspension pending enquiry especially in the light of the language of Section 6(A) of the Act. At the best, the report of the Director of Agricultural Marketing, dated 07-08-2007 is an interim report, it cannot be said that the enquiry into the allegations had been finally closed or put an end to even in the light of the language of the said order, especially, the concluding portion. Learned Counsel would also maintain that the power to be exercised under Section 6(A) of the Act of the 1st respondent and the 2nd respondent being concurrent, the impugned order does not suffer from any jurisdictional error. Even otherwise, the learned counsel would maintain that in the light of the language of Section 6(A) of the Act, the Joint Director is not competent and the Joint Director has no role to play and there is no delegation of power to the Joint Director. Learned counsel also would maintain that, it appears in the light of the report of the Joint Director without proper application of mind, the 2nd respondent made an order, by that itself, it cannot be contended that the 1st respondent is denude of all the powers under Section 6(A) of the Act. Learned counsel placed strong reliance on SURYA DEV RAI V. RAM CHANDER RAI AND OTHERS2. Learned counsel while further elaborating his submissions had taken this Court through the impugned order G.O. Rt. No. 1241 dated 24-09-2007 and further pointed out specifically to the references made in the order made by the 2nd respondent, Joint Press release dated 23-07-2007, representation of the Chairman, AMC, Hyderabad to the Commissioner and Director of Agricultural Marketing, dated 23-07-2007, representation of Chairman, AMC, Hyderabad to the Minister for marketing dated 24-07-2007 and also Lr. Rc.No. 1819/2006 dated 02-07-2007 of Joint Director of Marketing, Hyderabad. Learned counsel, in all fairness, would submit that the date 02-07-2007 may be a mistake. Learned counsel also would maintain that as can be seen from the nature of the representations, it is unknown why such representations were made by the Chairman and incidentally no doubt the Joint Press release of A.P. Grain and Seeds Merchants Association, Hyderabad had been referred to. Hence, the learned counsel would maintain that the Government as superior authority always has the residuary power, it is not as though the said report was called for by the Government and at the instance of the Government the said report was submitted, even as well reflected from the references, hence to contend that the Government is not competent to make such an order is totally an unsustainable contention.

9. Heard the learned counsel. Perused the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, the counter affidavit filed by the 5th respondent, the impugned G.O.Rt. No. 1241 dated 24-09-2007, and the other material papers placed before this Court.

10. Sri B. Chenna Reddy, the writ-petitioner, had averred in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition that he is a farmer and engaged in cultivation and dairy farm and has been the Chairman of Agricultural Market Committee, Hyderabad and he was appointed by the 1st respondent as such for a period of three years in exercise of its powers conferred under sub-section (1) of Section 6, read with sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 5 of the Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce & Livestock) Markets Act, 1966 by issuing G.O.Ms. No. 60, dated 09-03-2006 and since then he has been continuing as Chairman of Agricultural Market Committee, Hyderabad, till date.

11. It is also stated that he had been striving hard to develop the market yards under the control of the 3rd respondent Market Committee in all respects and take all steps to provide essential facilities in the interests of all the parties engaged in activities within the premises of market yards including hamalies, traders and clerks. It is also further averred that there are seven market yards under the control of the 3rd respondent situated at Gudimalkapur, Mir-alam-Mandi, Begum Bazar, Madannapet, Kishan Gunj, Chandrayanagutta and Malakpet, that all the ryots in and around Hyderabad, Nalgonda, Ranga Reddy and Medak Districts bring their agricultural produce and livestock to these market yards and sell them away for a competitive price, that he would take all steps as the Chairman of the 3rd respondent to see that the interests of the ryots, who are the bedrock of the economy of this country and take all steps to protect them from the clutches of middlemen, such as traders and commission agents, that under his chairmanship the 3rd respondent reached its targeted income i.e. Rs. 2,75,00,000/- for the year 2006-07 as against Rs. 1,45,00,000/- for the year 2005-06, that he had taken steps to shift the Jambagh flower business to Gudimalkapur market yard, that he prevented the illegal business conducted in the name of 'Ganta' by getting issued notices through officers concerned and he took steps to prevent the method of collecting money illegally on white slips (tella chittis) instead of thak patti and got refunded the money to the tune of several thousands to the ryots by taking action on concerned traders, that the traders and commission agents, who are demanding commissions illegally at 8% instead of 2 or 4% by getting licenses with benami names and evading payment of income-tax and sales tax ought to have been paid to the Government, were taken to task by regular inspections and got refunded the money collected excessively to the ryots and took steps as per the procedure stipulated in the Act and the rules made thereunder, that he directed the concerned officials of the 3rd respondent committee to take steps to enhance the income to the market committee and that he had also taken steps to construct houses to the hamalis in the premises of the respective market yards.

12. It is further stated by the petitioner that he made a representation to the Hon'ble Chief Minister to protect the interests of market committee by enquiring into the issue of encroachment of the market committee's land and to protect the interests of traders and ryots, that he made a representation to the respondents informing the steps taken by him to protect the interests of ryots enclosing the pamphlets issued educating the ryots in respect of the illegalities that were being committed by the commission agents and traders and that there is no allegation of misappropriation or misconduct against him in his tenure of 1 1/2 year as the Chairman. Further, it is stated that all the steps taken in the interests of poor ryots and growers and to develop the 3rd respondent Market Committee and market yards under its control caused deep anguish in the minds of traders and commission agents as the above steps prevented them from demanding or collecting excessive commission and performing illegal activities at the cost of poor and destitute ryots and hence the traders, commission agents and their associations bore-grudge against him, that in furtherance of their vengeance against him, one Association known as Andhra Pradesh Grain & Seeds Merchants Association, Malakpet made a complaint to the 2nd respondent with certain allegations against him.

13. It is also averred by the petitioner that the A.P. Grain & Seeds Merchants Association operating in Malakpet, Hyderabad made the above complaint dated 23- 07-2007 to the 2nd respondent with an ill-will and mala fide intention to get rid of him as the Chairman of the 3rd respondent since he is taking steps to protect the interests of the ryots and growers from the clutches of its members viz. traders, middlemen and commission agents and in pursuance of the said complaint, the Association conducted bandh on 25-07-2007 in the Malakpet Market yard. It is further averred that the above allegations are vague and baseless and invented only to get rid of him as Chairman of the Market Committee and it is also relevant to point out that out of the seven market yards, which are under the control of the 3rd respondent Market Committee, only the above said association operating in Malakpet Market Committee made the said complaint even though there are several associations are operating in all the seven market yards, that from this it is clear that the said complaint is based on no material and tainted with mala fides and ill-will and for oblique motives and extraneous considerations and that aggrieved by the ill-will and vilification campaign resorted to by the Association, he made a representation to the Minister Smt. Sabitha Indra Reddy informing all the events.

14. It is also further averred by the petitioner that in pursuance of the said complaint dated 23-07-2007, the Joint Director of Marketing, Hyderabad, conducted a detailed enquiry and submitted its report to the 2nd respondent on 28-07-2007 wherein it was reported that the allegations are vague and baseless and no mala fides cannot be attributed to the Chairman and it is also reported that there are oblique motives and extraneous considerations behind the said complaint and further reported to the 2nd respondent that the market committee had initiated steps to educate the farmers and purchasers about the mal- practices committed by the traders and commission agents through public address system and pamphlets and further reported that the Chairman, Agricultural Market Committee had taken steps to stop such mal practices of 'Ganta' and also taken steps to return the unauthorized collections made by the traders from ryots. Further, it is averred that on the basis of the said report dated 28-07-2007 the 2nd respondent addressed a letter dated 7-8-2007 to the 1st respondent referring the said report seeking necessary orders from the 1st respondent-Government and the 1st respondent having received the report dated 28-7-2007 and the letter of 2nd respondent passed the impugned order without considering the said reports and without having any material before it and hence the same is illegal, unjust, arbitrary etc. and that the impugned order is based on no material and a total non-speaking order and hence the impugned is liable to be set aside.

15. It is also further averred that the impugned order was passed in view of the powers under Section 6(A) of the Act and the relevant portion of the same reads as hereunder.

"6-A. Power of Government or the Director of Marketing to suspend the Chairman of the Market Committee:-

If the Government or the Director of Marketing are of the opinion that the Chairman of Market Committee willfully omitted or refused to carry out the orders of the Government or the Director of Marketing for the proper working of the Market Committee or abused his position or the powers vested with him and that the further continuance of such person in the office would be detrimental to the interests of market committee or the inhabitants of the market, the Government or the Director of Marketing may, by order, suspend the Chairman of the Market Committee from the office for a period not exceeding three months pending investigation into the charges and the action thereto under the foregoing provisions of this Section."

16. It is also further averred that from the reading of the above said section, it is clear that the respondents can suspend the Chairman, if the incumbent is willfully omitted or refused to carry out their orders, or abused his position or the powers vested with him and that his further continuance in office would be detrimental to the interests of the Market Committee, that in the instant case, it is not the case of the respondents that he omitted or refused to carry out their directions and it is also evident from the record that he, as the Chairman of the Committee acted responsibly with due diligence keeping in mind the interests of the Market Committee and inhabitants of the market, as such, there is no complaint whatsoever from any of the associations operating in the seven market yards which are under the control of the 3rd respondent except the present complaint from the association, which bore-grudge against him as stated above for preventing their illegal income viz. collecting excess commission and other source of illegal income at the cost of poor ryots and hence invoking the provisions under Section 6-A to suspend him is highly untenable and unwarranted and in fact the enquiry conducted by the Joint Director of Marketing reveals the mala fide intention and illegal activities of the Association.

17. It is also further averred by the petitioner that having received the complaint from the association, the Joint Director conducted a detailed enquiry in the presence of all the interested including himself and submitted its report to the 2nd respondent, who in turn informed the same to the 1st respondent, that the 1st respondent who has to pass necessary orders after considering all aspects with proper application of mind and considering the detailed report submitted by the Joint Director and the Commissioner, passed the impugned order suspending him without considering any of the relevant material and without issuing any reasons and hence the impugned order is liable to be set aside. It is further stated by the petitioner that the entire issue is based on a vague, frivolous, and vexatious complaint made by the association with ill-will and for oblique motive and extraneous considerations and the same was enquired into in detail by a responsible officer i.e. Joint Director of Marketing, Hyderabad, which was confirmed and informed by the 2nd respondent-Commissioner to the 1st respondent. In such circumstances, the writ petitioner approached this Court praying for the reliefs referred to supra.

18. The counter affidavit of the 5th respondent alone had been filed. The President of the 5th respondent-association has sworn to the counter affidavit, wherein it is averred that the 5th respondent association is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, vide registration No. 771 of 1957 and the association is avowed to the protection of welfare of its members who are traders in the agricultural market committee, in so far as the market area of Srikrupa Market, Malakpet is concerned. This respondent stated that there are about 200 members in its association and they are not concerned with the other market yards which are under the control and supervision of Hyderabad Market Committee and their association is interested in safeguarding the interests of its members in so far as the Srikrupa Market which forms part of Hyderabad Market Committee is concerned. It is also stated that the impugned order in G.O.Rt. No. 1241 dated 24-09-2007 is only an order of suspension pending enquiry into the allegations leveled against the petitioner on account of his misconduct in the office of the Chairman of Hyderabad Market Committee, that their association had issued a press release dated 23-07-2007 elaborating the misconduct of the writ petitioner and the same had been published in various newspapers dated 24-07-2007 and subsequently they have been requesting the 1st respondent to take action against the writ petitioner for the misconduct committed by him while functioning as Chairman of the market committee.

19. This respondent further averred that they have abundant evidence to say that the petitioner, abusing his office, has demanded bribes from the traders while threatening them with cancellation of their licenses under the Act and as and when a regular enquiry is conducted, their members are ready and willing to depose the truth of the matter and that an order of suspension pending enquiry is not amenable to judicial review since the power of suspension has got to be exercised on subjective satisfaction of the 1st respondent. This respondent further averred that the press release issued by their association dated 23-07- 2007 is based on hard facts and it is incorrect to say that there is no factual foundation for the press release issued by them, copy of which marked to respondents 1 and 2 also, that the impugned order is legally valid since Section 6(A) of the Act has conferred a concurrent power on the State Government as well as Director, Marketing in so far as suspension of the Chairman is concerned, however, this does not mean that the view of the Director, Marketing contained in his letter dated 07-08-2007 shall be deemed to be binding on the 1st respondent, that in the said letter of the 2nd respondent, a reference made to some verification was done by the Joint Director of Agricultural Marketing in his letter dated 02-07-2007, that when their press release itself is dated 23- 07-2007, it is un-understandable as to how the Joint Director has submitted some letter/report dated 02-07-2007 to the 2nd respondent, that the 2nd respondent in his letter dated 07-08-2007 has not taken any pains to apply his mind as to the necessity or otherwise of suspending the petitioner under Section 6(A) of the Act, that as a matter of fact, the 1st respondent has never called for any report or preliminary enquiry either by the Director, Marketing or by the Joint Director, Marketing, and thus the so-called report of the Joint Director, which appears to be totally partisan in favour of the petitioner and the letter of the 2nd respondent dated 7-8-2007 are in the nature of unsolicited information to the 1st respondent, obviously aim at prevailing upon the 1st respondent to lean in favour of the petitioner and thus no credence can be given to the letter of 2nd respondent dated 07-08-2007 and the so-called report of the Joint Director and in this view of the matter, the contention of the petitioner that the 1st respondent could not have passed the impugned order in the face of the letter of the 2nd respondent dated 07-08-2007 cannot be countenanced by this Court.

20. This respondent further averred that the power of suspension pending enquiry and the exercise thereof is a matter which is not open to judicial review since it is only an intermediary stage of the exercise of disciplinary action against the petitioner and that the impugned order is in strict compliance of the requirements of Section 6(A) of the Act and therefore it does not warrant interference by this Court in its Certiorari jurisdiction as laid down by the Supreme Court in 2003 (6) SCC 675 at para-38. This respondent further averred that further continuance of the petitioner in office as Chairman of the Market Committee would result in serious detriment to the interest of the traders and the market committee. Hence dismissal of writ petition had been prayed for.

21. Section 6(1) of the Act already had been referred to supra. The words "if the Government or the Director of Marketing are of the opinion" would assume some importance. Further, the words, "that the further continuance of such person in the office would be detrimental to the interests of market committee or inhabitants of the market." also would assume some importance in the present context.

22. In Words and Phrases "opinion" had been defined.

"An "opinion" creates no fact but is what someone thinks about something and the thought may be accurate or inaccurate and yet represent the honest conviction of person expressing it, and because of that, opinion evidence is generally considered of a low grade and not entitled to much weight against positive testimony of actual facts"

23. In the New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary - Encyclopedic Edition, "opinion" is defined:

Opinion: a mental estimate/ a belief or conviction, based on what seems probable or true but not on demonstrable fact/ the collective views of a large number of people, esp. on some particular topic, to offend local opinion/ a formal expression by an expert of what he judges to be the case or the right course of action, counsel's opinion."

24. In EKTA SHAKTI FOUNDATION v. GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI3 while dealing with the limited scope of judicial review in relation to administrative action, the Apex Court held in paras 10 to 12:

"While exercising the power of judicial review of administrative action, the Court is not the appellate authority and the Constitution does not permit the Court to direct or advise the executive in matter of policy or to sermonize any matter which under the Constitution lies within the sphere of the Legislature or the executive, provided at page SC 2612 these authorities do not transgress their constitutional limits or statutory power. (See Ashif Hamid v. State of J. and K. (AIR 1989 SC 1899), Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. v. Union of India (AIR 1990 SC 1277). The scope of judicial enquiry is confined to the question whether the decision taken by the Government is against any statutory provisions or is violative of the fundamental rights of the citizens or is opposed to the provisions of the Constitution. Thus, the position is that even if the decision taken by the Government does not appear to be agreeable to the Court it cannot interfere.

The correctness of the reasons which prompted the Government in decision making, taking one course of action instead of another is not a matter of concern in judicial review and the Court is not the appropriate forum for such investigation.

The policy decision must be left to the Government as it alone can adopt which policy should be adopted after considering all the points from different angles. In matter of policy decisions or exercise of discretion by the Government so long as the infringement of fundamental right is not shown Courts will have no occasion to interfere and the Court will not and should not substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the executive in such matters. In assessing the propriety of a decision of the Government the Court cannot interfere even if a second view is possible from that of the Government."

25. Reliance also was placed on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in N. SREERAMA MURTHY AND OTHERS v. THE STATE OF A.P. AND ANOTHER4 wherein at para-10 it was observed:

"It was next feebly contended that greater representation was given to the growers as compared to the traders on the market committee. This contention is without substance for there is no law that all the interests which may be represented on a given committee constituted under the enactment, should be equally represented. The representation on a particular committee is itself a right granted by the Statute and not a fundamental right or a natural right. If the Legislature, in its wisdom, having regard to the large number of growers of agriculture produce and owners of livestock and products of livestock, has given a larger representation to them on the market committee than to the traders who are infinitesimally few as compared to the growers, that legislation cannot be struck down as vesting an arbitrary power or as discriminatory. In the matter of nomination to the committees constituted under an enactment, no citizen can claim a fundamental right or violation of any such fundamental right on that ground."

26. In MANI SUBRAT JAIN v. STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHER5, it was held: "It is elementary though it is to be restated that no can ask for a mandamus without a legal right. There must be a judicially enforceable right as well as a legally protected right before one suffering a legal grievance can ask for a mandamus. A person can be said to be aggrieved only when a person is denied a legal right by some one who has a legal duty to do something or to abstain from doing something. AIR 1973 SC 2216 and AIR 1976 SC 578 had been relied upon."

27. Further, strong reliance was placed on SURYA DEV RAI v. RAM CHANDER RAI AND OTHERS6 wherein the Apex Court at para-38 observed:

"Such like matters frequently arise before the High Courts. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder:

(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1-7-2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction - by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or )ii_ in excess of its jurisdiction - by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.

(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.

(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character.

(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case."

28. Learned Senior Counsel representing the writ petitioner placed strong reliance on UNION OF INDIA v. K.D. PANDEY AND ANOTHER (1st supra) wherein the disciplinary proceedings were initiated against R in respect of six charges. After the enquiry, a report was submitted to the effect that none of the charges levelled against R stood proved. The disciplinary authority examined the matter and found that four of the six charges could be substantially proved beyond doubt with the available documentary evidence and, thereafter, remitted the matter for further inquiry. On the said direction of the disciplinary authority, the enquiry officer made a subsequent report finding R guilty of four charges. Based on that report, the Railway Board dismissed R. The Tribunal as well as the High Court set aside the said order as it was not a case of further enquiry but a fresh opinion had been furnished on the same material. The appellant herein had challenged the reinstatement of R which was ordered by the Tribunal and subsequently confirmed by the High Court. The Apex Court while dismissing the appeal held that, from the order made by the Railway Board as well as from that part of the file where the inquiry report made earlier is discussed, it is clear that specific findings have been given in respect of each of the charges after discussing the matter. Hence, in such case, the matter could not have been remitted to the enquiring authority for further inquiry. Indeed this resulted in second inquiry and not in a further inquiry on the same set of charges and the material on record. If this process is allowed the inquires can go on perpetually until the view of the enquiring authority is in accord with that of the disciplinary authority and it would be abuse of the process of law. The decision of the Apex Court referred to above is in relation to service jurisprudence and is distinguishable on facts in the light of the nature of the orders involved in the present writ petition.

29. This is no doubt, a peculiar case wherein on the strength of the Joint Press release and also the representations made by the writ-petitioner, the 2nd respondent in the light of the report submitted by the Joint Director made an order. Though certain of the observations made appear to be in favour of the writ-petitioner, the concluding portion would clearly go to show that the Government may take a view and issue further necessary orders in this matter. This proceeding Lr. No. 5395/2006, dated 07-09-2006 is addressed by the Commissioner and Director of Agricultural Marketing to the Principal Secretary to Government, A&C (Agrl. Marketing) Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad. The subject and reference both read as hereunder. "Sub: Agrl. Marketing Department - Joint Press release by Andhra Pradesh Grain and Seeds Merchants Association, Hyderabad - Mahaboob Mansion Market Yard - Band from 25.07.2007 to 27.7.2007 by Traders and A.P. Grain & Seeds Merchants Association - Allegations against the Chairman, Agricultural Marketing Committee, Hyderabad - Submission of report - Reg.

Ref: 1. Joint Press release dated 23.07.2007 by A.P. Grain & Seeds Merchants Association, Malakpet, Hyderabad.

2. Representation of Chairman, AMC, Hyderabad to the Commissioner & Director of Agrl. Marketing, dated 23.07.2007

3. Representation of Chairman, AMC, Hyderabad to the Minister for Marketing, date 24.07.2007

4. Lr. Rc. No.1819/2006, dated 2.07.2007 of Joint Director of Marketing, Hyderabad."

The allegations were referred to and further it was observed:

"The Joint Director of Agricultural Marketing, Hyderabad vide reference 4th cited reported that the allegation of demanding money by the Chairman, Agricultural Marketing Committee, Hyderabad from traders could not be verified as there is no specific and sufficient material proof for verification. Alleging that they have given bribe to the Chairman, Agricultural Market Committee, which is also unlawful Act, and by giving bribes also, they are liable to be punishable as per law. Their threatening to the market committee is also unlawful act and they should abide the rule of regulations as provided in the A.P. (A.P. & L.S.) Market act, 1966, Rules and bye-laws thereunder."

Certain reasons were recorded relating to the other allegations and it was also specified.

"It is alleged that with the support of some trader members including Vice-Chairman, this type of activities are going on against the Chairman, Agricultural Market Committee and the ultimate idea is to keep the trader member in the chair having linkage with trading community obtained Market Committee Membership, under the guise of growers though they are doing business. It shall be enquired into and a report will be submitted in this regard separately."

The instructions and the report of the Joint Director of Agricultural Marketing, Hyderabad, had been repeatedly referred to and the concluding portion is as hereunder.

"In view of the above, the Government may take a view and issue further necessary orders in this matter."

30. The impugned order G.O.Rt. No. 1241, dated 24- 09-2007, no doubt, refers to the representation of A.P. Grain & Seeds Merchants Association dated 28-07-2007 and from the Commissioner and Director of Agricultural Marketing, A.P. Hyderabad Lr. No. 5395/2006, dated 07-08-2007. This second reference made in the impugned order G.O.Rt. No. 1241 is made a serious ground of attack by the learned Senior Counsel representing the writ-petitioner. The impugned order reads as hereunder. "GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

ABSTRACT

Agricultural Market Committee - Sri B. Chinna Reddy, Chairman, Agricultural Market Committee, Hyderabad - Suspension - Orders - Issued. AGRICULTURE & COOPERATION (AGRL. MKTG.I) DEPARTMENT

G.O.Rt. No. 1241 Dated: 24.09.2007 Read the following:-

1. From the representation of A.P. Grain & Seeds Merchants Association, dated 28.07.2007.

2. From the Commissioner & Director of Agricultural Marketing, A.P. Hyderabad Lr. No. 5395/2006, dt. 07-08-2007.

O R D E R

In the reference 1st read above the A.P. Grain & Seeds Merchants Association, Malakpet alleged the following allegations against the Chairman, Agricultural Market Committee, Hyderabad.

1. The Chairman, Agriculture Market Committee, Hyderabad is threatening the Traders, Hamalies, Gumastas and Farmers. He is also issuing notice to the Traders against the rule and demanding the money duly blackmailing that their licenses would be cancelled. Further, he is also using abusive words on traders.

2. There is a separate way for "Masjid" the Chairman with the help of anti social elements dismantled the walls and created a road. In this connection, the matter was brought to the notice of police and Government Officials and with the help of police demolished were restored.

3. Apparently the Chairman with the help of anti-social elements and with his powers threatening all the traders.

2. In the reference 2nd read above, the Commissioner and Director of Agriculture, Marketing has furnished an interim report to the Government. Government after careful consideration of the matter hereby place Sri B. Chinna Reddy, Chairman, Agricultural Market Committee, Hyderabad under suspension for a period of three months with immediate effect under Section 6(A) of A.P. (Andhra Pradesh Produce & Livestock) Market Act, 1966,pending further enquiry into the matter.

3. The Commissioner & Director of Agricultural Marketing, A.P. Hyderabad is requested to take necessary action accordingly.

(BY ORDER AND IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNOR OF ANDHRA PRADESH)

PANKAJ DWAIVEDI,

PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT".

31. On a careful reading of both the orders referred to supra and also in the light of the language employed in the order made by the 2nd respondent, which in fact, is based on the report of the Joint Director, though prima facie some irregularity is shown, it cannot be said that the impugned G.O.Rt. No. 1241 suffers from any jurisdictional error and it cannot be said that the Government is denuded of the power of putting the petitioner under suspension pending enquiry under Section 6(A) of the Act, especially, in the light of the language of the provision and also in the light of the fact that the report of the 2nd respondent being only an interim report and that too in the light of the concluding portion of the said report, leaving the decision open to the Government. This is the discretion exercised by the Government in the sphere of administration and in the light of the limitations of a writ Court in exercising the power of judicial review in this sphere, especially, in view of the fact that this is only a suspension pending enquiry, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the said decision of the Government.

32. It is needless to say that the writ petition being devoid of merit, the same shall stand dismissed at the stage of admission. No order as to costs.

33. However, let the enquiry be expedited and completed within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

?1 (2002) 10 SCC 471

2 (2003) 6 SCC 675

3 AIR 2006 S.C. 2609

4 AIR 1981 A.P. 395

5 AIR 1977 SC 276

6 (2003) 6 S.C.C. 675